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A HUMAN RIGHTS COURT FOR
AFRICA, AND AFRICANS
Frans Viljoen*

T

he Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (Protocol) entered into force on
January 25, 2004.1 The highest organ of the Organization of
* Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa;
Director of Academic Programs, Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria; co-editor of the African Human Rights Law Journal; E-mail: fviljoen@hakuna.up.ac.za.
1. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 10,
1998 (entered into force Jan. 25, 2004) (By December 25, 2003, the required
number of ratifications (fifteen) had been deposited; the Protocol entered into
force thirty days thereafter, as provided for in art. 34(3) of the Protocol.) [hereinafter Protocol to the African Charter], reprinted in 7 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 419
(1999), http://www.africa-union.org/home/welcome.htm; African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 21, 1986, art. 66, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) (art. 66 allows for “Special protocols or agreements” to “supplement” the Charter) [hereinafter African Charter]. See also THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS:
THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986–2000, 353 (Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray
eds., 2002) [hereinafter SYSTEM IN PRACTICE]; FATSAH OUGUERGOUZ, THE
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA
FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 867 (2003);
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1999 (Christof Heyns ed., 2002) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1999]; HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA (Christof Heyns ed.,
2004) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS LAW]. See generally Julia Harrington, The
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986–2000 305 (Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray eds., 2002); Ibrahim Ali Badawi Elsheikh, The
Future Relationship Between the African Court and the African Commission, 2
AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 252 (2002); Nico Krisch, The Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 58 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLANDISHCES
ÖFFENLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERECHT 713 (1998); Makau Mutua, The African
Human Rights Court: A Two–Legged Stool?, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 342 (1999); Gino
J. Naldi & Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Reinforcing the African System of
Human Rights: The Protocol on the Establishment of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 16 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 431 (1998); Andreas O’Shea,
A Critical Reflection on the Proposed African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 285 (2001); Edward Kofi Quashigah, The African
Court of Human Rights: Prospects, in Comparison with the European Court of
Human Rights and the Inter–American Court of Human Rights, in THE
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African Unity (OAU), the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government (Assembly), adopted the Protocol in July 1998,
some five-and-a-half years earlier.2 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court or African Human
Rights Court), after the election of eleven judges, is expected to
start functioning in 20053 as an institution of the African Union
(AU), which replaced the OAU in 2002.4 The goal of the African
Court is to complement the protective mandate of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), which was established as the quasi-judicial implementation body of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(African Charter) in 1987.5
AFRICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, TENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE 59 (A.V. Lowe, et al. eds., 1998); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late than
Never, 3 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 45 (2000) [hereinafter Toward the African Court].
2. O’Shea, supra note 1, at 286 n.6.
3. It is not certain when judges will be elected. At its last session in July
2004, the AU Assembly decided that the African Court and the AU’s Court of
Justice should be “integrated into one Court.” A report on the modalities of
such a step must be submitted to the Assembly at its next meeting (around
January 2005). Assembly of the African Union, Decisions on the Seats of the
rd
African Union, 3 Ord. Sess., Assembly/AU/Dec.45(III) (July 6–8, 2004),
http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Protocol of the AU’s
Court of Justice, adopted July 11, 2003, and requiring fifteen ratifications for
its entry into force, had secured four (Comoros, Mauritius, Mozambique, and
Rwanda) by July 31, 2004. See List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, at
http://www.africa-union.org/home/welcome.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
4. On the transformation of OAU into the AU, see generally Konstantinos
D. Magliveras & Gino J. Naldi, The African Union–A New Dawn for Africa?,
51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 415 (2002); Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Constitutive Act of
the African Union and Institution-Building in Postcolonial Africa, 16 LEIDEN
J. INT’L L. 157 (2003), available at http://journals.cambridge.org (last visited
Aug. 28, 2004); Corinne A. Packer & Donald Rukare, The New African Union
and Its Constitutive Act, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002).
5. African Charter, supra note 1; HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 7 (Christof
H. Heyns ed., 1996); OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 803; SYSTEM IN PRACTICE,
supra note 1, at 353, app. 1. For an explanation of the African Commission’s
protective mandate, see Rachel Murray, A Comparison Between the African
and European Courts of Human Rights, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 195, 196–97
(2002) [hereinafter Comparison Between the African and European Courts].
See also EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 22–25 (1996); Chidi Anselm
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Rather than provide a comprehensive overview of the Protocol, this Article will focus on the role of individuals, referred to
as “Africans” in the title, before the African Court. 6 I will ask
the following questions: Do individuals have access to (including
the standing to bring cases before)7 the new Court? Will the
new Court be able to overcome the African Commission’s weaknesses with regard to individual communications? These questions will be explored in Parts II and III, and are framed by a
brief historical introduction in Part I, while Parts IV and V discuss the broader legal context and some procedural issues bearing on the benefits to individuals of the African Court.8 There
are two reasons I chose the “individual” as the prism through
which to view the Protocol. First, individuals have emerged
from the shadows of the Second World War into the spotlight of
international law: exemplifying this trend are the recognition of
individual rights in numerous human rights treaties, the acceptance of individual-complaint mechanisms, individual account-

Odinkalu & Camilla Christensen, The African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights: The Development of its Non-State Communication Procedures,
20 HUM. RTS. Q. 235 (1998); OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 550–63; Frans
Viljoen, Overview of the African Regional Human Rights System [hereinafter
Overview of the African Regional Human Rights System], in HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW IN AFRICA 1998 128, 158–82 (Christof H. Heyns & Paul Tavernier eds.,
2001) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1998].
6. The use of the word “Africans” in the title is not intended in an exclusionary sense, but is chosen to underline the “human” (or “individual”) implications of the new institution. Echoing the African Charter, the term “people”
was not used because of the debate regarding its meaning. State parties to
the African Charter have obligations to non-African “individuals” within their
jurisdictions, and nationality is not a general prerequisite for lodging complaints with either the African Commission or the African Court of Human
Rights.
7. “Standing” is used here in a broad sense, denoting “any right to appear
as a party before an international court.” Franz Matscher, Standing Before
International Courts and Tribunals, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 594 (Max Planck Inst. for Comp. Pub. L. 2000).
8. “Individual” is used here in a broad sense, similar to its use in the
phrase “individual complaints mechanism,” which distinguishes it from the
phrase “inter-state complaints mechanism.” In other words, “individual” includes groups of individuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well
as their legal and other representatives, such as their relatives. The term also
encompasses “person,” “author,” “applicant” and “complainant.” As such, the
term is broader than “victim,” a word avoided in this contribution because of
its stigmatizing connotation of helplessness and powerlessness.
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ability for grave human rights violations before the International Criminal Tribunals for the ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY),
Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC),
and the principle of universal jurisdiction.9 Second, it was
mainly through individual complaints that the potential of the
United Nations (UN) and regional human rights instruments
has been unleashed, particularly in the African system.10 Put
differently, the success of the African Court will be determined
primarily by the way in which it deals with individuals as its
natural and logical constituency.
I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
When the African human rights system was forged in the late
1970s and early 1980s, the possibility of an African human
rights court was raised, but rejected.11 Participants in the drafting process concluded that the continent was not yet ready for a
judicial institution to make pronouncements on human rights
violations committed by states. In the introduction to the first
document in the travaux préparatoires of the African Charter’s
substantive provisions, the main drafter, Keba M’Baye, highlighted the omission of a judicial institution, but explained that
it was “thought premature to [establish a judicial institution] at
this stage.”12 Prophetically, he added that the “ideal is, no
doubt, a good and useful one which could be introduced in the

9. See generally Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 462 (1998).
10. On the significant role and potential of NGOs in Africa, see, for example, CLAUDE E. WELCH, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: ROLES AND
STRATEGIES OF NON–GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (1995); Kwadwo Appiagyei–Atua, Human Rights NGO’s and Their Role in the Promotion and
Protection of Rights in Africa, 9 INT’L J. ON MINORITY GROUP RTS. 265 (2002).
11. See Keba M’Baye, Introduction to M’Baye Proposal, Draft African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1979, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/1,
para. 4, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1999, supra note 1, at 65 (“The establishment of a Human Rights Court to redress cases of violation of human
rights is not included in the Draft Charter. It is thought premature to do so at
this stage. The idea is, no doubt, a good and useful one which could be introduced in the future by means of an additional protocol to the Charter.”). The
only reference to a court in the later travaux préparatoires is the indication
that a delegation proposed an amendment establishing an African court to
judge crimes against mankind.
12. Id.
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13
future by means of an additional protocol to the Charter.” In
response to questions posed at the subsequent ministerial meeting, M’Baye, as Chairman of the Committee of Experts, explained that the establishment of an African Human Rights
Court was not a pressing concern because the Convention on
the Elimination and the Suppression of the Crime of Apartheid
already provided for “an international penal court” and the
United Nations was considering the establishment of “an international court to repress crime against mankind.”14 This exchange implies, therefore, that the proposed African Court was
initially envisioned as an instrument to punish crimes against
humanity, including apartheid. An unnamed delegation proposed the establishment of a court “to judge crimes against
mankind and violations of human rights,”15 thus extending the
possible material jurisdiction of such a court beyond crimes
against humanity. However, those at the meeting concluded
that “it was untimely to discuss it,”16 and there is no indication
that optional acceptance of a court’s jurisdiction – similar to the
European compromise, which led to the establishment of the
European Court of Human Rights (European Court)—was discussed.17

13. Id.
14. Organization of African Unity, Rapporteur’s Report of the Ministerial
Meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/Draft Rapt. Rpt (II)
Rev. 4, para. 13 [hereinafter Rapporteur’s Report], reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 1999, supra note 1, at 95.
15. Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 14, para. 117 (emphasis added).
16. Id.
17. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, (the European Court of Human Rights
could only be established after eight states had accepted its optional jurisdiction) [hereinafter European Convention], available at http://www.
unhcr.md/article/conv.htm. The European Convention was fundamentally
revised after the adoption of Protocol No. 11 thereto, entering into force on
Nov. 1, 1998. See generally Council of Europe, Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby,
33 I.L.M. 943 (1994) [hereinafter Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11].
Unless otherwise stated, all references to the European Convention in this
article are to the 1950 version, not to its subsequent Protocols, because the
African system’s structure more closely resembles the initial two–tiered system in Europe (which included both the European Commission of Human
Rights and European Court of Human Rights) than the current system (which
includes only the European Court of Human Rights).
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The inception of the African Charter can be traced to 1961,
when a pan-African conference on the rule of law was held in
Lagos, Nigeria.18 The conference, in “The Law of Lagos,” recommended that an African Convention on Human Rights be
adopted and a court of appropriate jurisdiction be created.19
Significantly, the conference consisted of judges, practicing lawyers and law professors from 23 states, not merely of activists
or NGOs.20 However, when the OAU was formed some two
years later, judicial dispute resolution was not yet a priority
and was, instead, overshadowed by preoccupations with sovereignty and territorial integrity.21 Under the 1963 OAU Charter,
disputes were to be resolved by the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government.22 The one legal institution provided for under
23
the Charter, a legal committee, was never established.
This brief historical overview confirms that the establishment
of the African Commission as a quasi-judicial body was deliberate. The African Commission was made unmistakably subservient to the Assembly, its political master, to which it had to
refer serious cases and report annually.24 The vague and insufficiently grounded individual complaint procedure in the Charter was strengthened and secured by the African Commission’s
Rules of Procedure and subsequent practice.25 States have, for
18. International Commission of Jurists, The Law of Lagos, para. 4 (Jan.
1961), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1999, supra note 1, at 299.
19. Id. (statement formulated as an invitation to African governments “to
study the possibility” of creating “a court of appropriate jurisdiction”).
20. Id. pmbl.
21. See Alfred Chanda, The Organization of African Unity: An Appraisal,
21–24 ZAMBIA L.J. 1, 17–18 & 28 (1989–1992) (emphasizing the OAU Charter’s focus on sovereignty and territorial integrity).
22. See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, art.
27, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, 2 I.L.M. 766 [hereinafter OAU Charter], reprinted in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: BASIC DOCUMENTS AND
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 28 (M. Hamalengwa et al. eds., 1988). See generally
Amadu Sesay et al., THE OAU AFTER TWENTY YEARS (Yassin El–Ayouty &
William I. Zartman eds., 1984) (for a general discussion and history of the
OAU).
23. Tiyanjana Maluwa, International Law-Making in Post–Colonial Africa:
The Role of the Organization of African Unity, 49 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 81, 86
(2002).
24. African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 58–59.
25. See Rules of Procedure of the African Commission, Doc.
ACHPR/RP/XIX (1988) (amended June 10, 1995) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure], available at http://www.hrni.org/files/instruments/HRNi_EN_926.html,
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example, argued that only cases concerning massive or serious
violations may be lodged with the African Commission.26 However, the African Commission has rejected such arguments, and
remarked that its own practice has evolved to include individual complaints.27 Since its establishment in 1987, the African
Commission’s mandate has been both promotional and protective.28 As part of its promotional mandate, the Commission has
examined state reports, organized conferences, launched publications, and established Special Rapporteurs.29 Commissioners
were assigned individual countries to which they have undertaken promotional missions.30 From 1988 to 1992, the African
Commission received 173 individual complaints, an average of
fewer than twelve per year,31 and finalized ninety communica32
tions between 1988 and 2001. It has dealt with only one interstate communication, which still had not been finalized by the
beginning of 2004.33 This does not compare favourably to the

reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA 1997 11 (Christof H. Heyns &
Morne Van der Linde eds., 1999) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1997].
th
26. Jawara v. The Gambia, Communication 147/95, 149/96, 13 Ann. Activity Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, annex V, at 98,
th
para. 12 (1999–2000) [hereinafter 13 Ann. Activity Report], available at
http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../activity_repo
rts/activity13_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
27. Id. at 102, para. 42.
28. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 45 (sets out Commission’s general
mandate).
29. Id.
30. Victor Dankwa, The Promotional Role of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’
RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE 335, 341–44 (Michael Evans & Rachel
Murray eds., 2002) (Dankwa, an African Commissioner, previously served as
Commission Chair). See also Distribution of State Parties Among Commisth
sioners, 15 Ann. Activity Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’
th
Rights, Annex III, at 25 (2001–2002) [hereinafter 15 Ann. Activity Report].
31. These figures are based on my analysis of the Commission’s Annual
Activity Reports, excluding those communications directed at non-state parties. Additionally, communications closely related to each other, either by
content or by the state party complained against, have been counted together
as one communication. With these exclusions, the Commission’s official register shows the receipt of 277 communications by the end of 2002.
32. “Finalized” denotes conclusion in a friendly settlement, or findings on
admissibility and merits.
th
33. See 15 Ann. Activity Report, supra note 30, at 13 (stating Commission’s intention “to convene an Extraordinary Session to fully consider and
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caseload before the European Commission of Human Rights
(European Commission) in either the earlier or later part of its
life cycle,34 but it does not significantly differ from the activity
before the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC),35 the UN
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee),36 or the UN Committee Against Torture (CAT Committee).37
The idea of an African Human Rights Court took almost four
decades to ripen into the Protocol adopted by the OAU Assembly on June 10, 1998, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.38 The
number of NGOs enjoying observer status with the African
Commission had by then grown substantially,39 and the regular
pre-session workshops provided a forum to raise support for the
establishment of a court.40 Sessions of the African Commission
became a forum where NGOs campaigned for a court. Thus,
pioneered by NGOs, supported by the African Commission, and
examine” Communication 227/99, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi,
Rwanda and Uganda).
34. The European Commission dealt with 4,334 complaints in its first fifteen years of existence. EUROPÄISCHE MENSCHENRECHTENKOVENTION EMRKKOMMENTAR 987 (Jochem Abr. Frowein & Wolfgang Peukert eds., 2d ed. 1996)
(listing the complaints).
35. From 1977 to 1992, a sixteen year period, the HRC finalized some 240
cases. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
CCPR COMMENTARY 900–13 (1993) (containing a list of communications).
36. Since its establishment in 1969, the CERD Committee has received
seventeen complaints, twelve of which had been finalized by the beginning of
2000. See ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM IN THE
21 CENTURY 467 (2000).
37. From 1988 through February, 2000, 154 complaints were registered
with the CAT Committee and seventy-one have been finalized. See BAYEFSKY,
supra note 36, at 466.
38. See Ben Kioko, The Road to the African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights, in THE AFRICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW,
TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 70 (1998) (discussing the drafting history of the
Protocol).
39. By the end of 1994, some 140 NGOs had been granted observer status
with the African Commission. See Directory of NGOs with Observer Status
(listing dates on which observer status granted), http://www.achpr.org/
english/_info/directory_ngo_en.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
40. Among the many NGOs present at these workshops, the International
Commission of Justice (International Commission) was very influential. It
produced the first draft; although this draft was tabled at Cape Town, the
International Commission’s Secretary General at the time, Adama Dieng, was
a prominent figure in the process.
ST
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41
in receipt of high-level political backing, the movement for the
creation of an African Court received the cautious support of
the OAU Assembly in 1994. At its meeting in Tunis, the Assembly asked “the OAU Secretary-General to convene a meeting of government experts to ponder in conjunction with the
African Commission … over the means to enhance the efficiency
of the Commission in considering in particular the establishment of an African Court.”42 This resolution came just as a window of opportunity opened up in Africa following the end of the
Cold War. Democratization swept the continent and led to
multi-party elections, eventuating political change in Zambia,
Benin, South Africa, and Malawi.43 Tentative attitudes towards
judicial institutions have gradually been assuaged by the establishment and greater reliance on domestic constitutional courts,
paving the way for acceptance of a continental court.44 The end
of the Cold War also saw the proliferation of new international
judicial mechanisms, linking the adoption of the Protocol to a
global trend.45
Government experts, mainly lawyers, met in Cape Town in
September, 1995, and adopted the first draft Protocol (Cape
Town Draft Protocol).46 The Cape Town Draft Protocol made

41. At the Commission’s fourteenth session in 1993, then OAU Secretary
General Salim Ahmed Salim stated that the time had come for an African
Human Rights Court. See ANKUMAH, supra note 5, at 70.
42. Resolution on the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
th
13 Ord. Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the
Organization of African Unity, June 13–15, 1994, OAU Doc. AHG/Rtes 230
(XXX), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/resafchar30th.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
43. Int’l Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Democracy Forum
Report 1997, ch. 1, at http://www.idea.int/publications/1997forumreport/cha
pter1/chapter1.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
44. See Rainer Arnold, Constitutional Courts of Central and Eastern European Countries as a Dynamic Source of Modern Legal Ideas, 18 TUL. EUR. &
CIV. L.F. 99, 103, 105, 114 (2003).
45. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 697 (1999).
46. Report of the Government Experts Meeting on the Establishment of an
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/
EXP/AFC/HPR/RPT (I) Rev. 1 [hereinafter Report of the Government Experts], available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre_publications/hrla/refere
nces/DOCUMENTS%20LEADING%20UP%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHE
MENT%20OF%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p.170.doc (last visited
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acceptance of direct access to the African Court by individuals
an automatic consequence of ratification.47 After the Council of
Ministers discussed the draft, the Council referred it to another
meeting of government experts for further discussion,48 which
took place in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in April, 1997, and culminated in the second draft (Nouakchott Draft Protocol).49 This
draft amended the Cape Town Draft Protocol in two significant
respects. First, the number of ratifications required for the Protocol’s entry into force was increased from eleven to fifteen.50
Second, the Nouakchott Draft Protocol made optional a state’s
acceptance of the African Court’s competence to receive petitions directly from individuals.51 A third meeting of government
legal experts, this time enlarged to include diplomats, then took
place in Addis Ababa, culminating in the third draft (Addis
Ababa Draft Protocol).52 The changes mentioned above are reOct. 10, 2004). The Cape Town meeting was organized by OAU General Secretariat with the African Commission and “with the support of the International Commission of Jurists.” Id. See generally Gino J. Naldi and Konstantinos Magliveras, The Proposed African Court of Human and People’s Rights:
Evaluation and Comparison, 8 AFR. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 944 (1996) (discussing
the Cape Town Draft Protocol).
47. Art. 6 of the Cape Town Draft Protocol allows “individuals, non–
governmental organisations and groups of individuals” to bypass the Commission on “exceptional grounds.” Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court of Human
and Peoples’ Rights, Cape Town Draft Protocol, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/
EXP/AFC/HPR (1), art. 6 (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter Cape Town Draft Protocol],
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre_publications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS%2
0LEADING%20UP%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%20OF%20THE
%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p.170.doc, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
1999, supra note 1, at 240.
48. Report of the Government Experts, supra note 46.
49. Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on
the Establishment of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Nouakchott Draft Protocol, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PRO (2) (Apr. 1997)
[hereinafter Nouakchott Draft Protocol], reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
1999, supra note 1, at 259.
50. Id. art. 33(3).
51. Id. art. 6.
52. Draft Protocol to the African Chart on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
Addis Ababa Draft Protocol, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III)
Rev. 1 (Dec. 1997) [hereinafter Addis Ababa Draft Protocol], at
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre_publications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS%2
0LEADING%20UP%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%20OF%20THE
%20AFRICAN%20COURT%20p.170.doc.
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flected in the Addis Ababa Draft Protocol, which was the last
draft version promulgated before it was submitted to a Conference of Ministers of Justice and Attorneys-General, where minor amendments were made. The OAU Assembly then endorsed it without amendment.53
At its Twenty-fourth session in October, 1998, the African
Commission urged member states to ratify the Protocol “within
the shortest possible time.”54 In that year, however, only two
states (Burkina Faso and Senegal) ratified the Protocol.55 For
the next four years, the pace of ratification dropped to one country per year (Gambia in 1999, Mali in 2000, Uganda in 2001,
and South Africa in 2002).56 In 2003, the pace accelerated, with
nine states (Algeria, Burundi, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Lesotho,
Libya, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Togo) ratifying.57 By August 31,
2004, four more states (Gabon, Mozambique, Niger, and Nigeria) had become state parties to the Protocol, thus increasing
the total number of state parties to nineteen.58
There are several factors that may have precipitated this acceleration. The African Commission persisted in prodding
states to ratify, as evidenced by a call in May, 2002, urging “all
OAU member states to ratify or accede as soon as possible to
the Protocol.”59 In the late 1990s, human rights received strong
backing from the OAU Assembly and Secretary-General.60 The
53. See id. arts. 34(3), 34(6).
54. Resolution on the Ratification of the Additional Protocol on the Creath
tion of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 12 Ann. Activity
Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, annex IV, at 28
th
(1998–1999) [hereinafter 12 Ann. Activity Report].
55. Id.
56. African Union, List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded
to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, at
http://www.africa–union.org/Official_documents/Treaties_%20Conventions
_%20Protocols/List/Protocol%20on%20the%20African%20Court%20on%20Hu
man%20and%20Peoples%20Rights.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Resolution on the Ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Huth
man and Peoples’ Rights, 15 Ann. Activity Report, supra note 30, annex IV,
at 29.
60. See generally Kigali Declaration, May 8, 2003, AU Doc.
MIN/CONF/HRA/Decl.1 (I).
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OAU’s first ministerial conference on human rights in Africa
was held in 1999, followed by a second (the first under AU auspices) in May, 2003, in Kigali, Rwanda.61 The Kigali Declaration notes “with concern” that only nine states had ratified the
Protocol, and “appeals” to other states to follow suit, in particular “to enable [the Protocol] to come into force by July, 2003 as
required by Dec. AHG/Dec. 117 (XXXVIII).”62 The sudden surge
in acceptance may also be indicative of a spirit of greater commitment to African unity and the development of the AU and
its institutions. The speed with which a simple majority of
member states ratified the Protocol Establishing the Peace and
Security Council63 and the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing
the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African
Parliament exemplifies this trend.64 The institution of the first
interstate communication forced governments to take notice of
the African human rights system – it is more than coincidental
that all three respondent states have ratified the Protocol. On a
more cynical note, some states may have been motivated primarily by the prospect of bidding to host the African Court, an
avenue open only to state parties to the Protocol.65 African enthusiasm and participation in establishing the ICC, and its entry into force in 2002, also left its mark on the parallel process
of establishing the African Human Rights Court.66
61. Id. at 1.
62. Id. para. 26.
63. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security
st
Council of the African Union, July 10, 2002, AU Assembly, 1 Ord. Sess., art.
22(5) (entered into force Dec. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Protocol Relating to Peace
and Security Council], available at http://www.africa–union.org/home/
Welcome.htm.
64. Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the Economic Community Relating
to the Pan-African Parliament, Mar. 2, 2001, art. 22 (entered into force Dec.
14, 2003), available at http://www.africa–union.org/home/Welcome.htm.
65. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 25(1).
66. African participation in the creation of the ICC has been significant.
See generally Sivuyile Maqungo, The African Contribution Towards Establishment of an International Criminal Court, in 8 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 333
(2000). The ICC Statute and Protocol to the African Charter both opened for
ratification in 1998; the higher acceptance rate of the ICC Statute by African
states is revealing. By Oct. 19, 2004, twenty–six AU members had ratified the
ICC Statute, slightly higher than the nineteen Protocol ratifications. Coalition for the International Criminal Court, States Parties to the Rome Statute of
the ICC, at http://iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html (last
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II. COMPLEMENTING THE COMMISSION: FROM QUASI-JUDICIAL
TO JUDICIAL
The overarching aim of the African Court is to supplement
the African Commission’s individual communications procedure.67 Therefore, the question is whether the African Court
will be able to overcome the problems experienced by the Commission in dealing with these communications. Seven interlinked difficulties associated with the African Commission’s efforts, most resulting from its status as a quasi-judicial body, are
now discussed, and the African Court’s ability, as a judicial institution, to rectify these deficiencies is investigated.
A. Nature of the Findings: From Recommendatory to Binding
The African Commission’s findings (or “reports”) are not considered final. They are merely “recommendations” to the political body that had given life to the African Commission, the
OAU/AU Assembly.68 These findings become “final” only when
they are contained in the African Commission’s Annual Activity
Report and approved by the Assembly.69 This has weakened the
impact of the African Commission’s findings by inhibiting state
compliance.70

visited Oct. 19, 2004); List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded
to the Protocol, supra note 56. Twelve states (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Gabon,
The Gambia, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa
and Uganda) have ratified both, thus leaving fourteen states that have ratified the ICC Statute but not the Protocol. Id.
67. See African Charter, supra note 1, art. 2
68. See African Charter, supra note 1, art. 58(2) (note use of the term “recommendations”). See also ANKUMAH, supra note 5, at 74.
69. Whether the “adoption” of these findings by the OAU/AU “converts”
them into legally binding decisions may depend on the legal force of those
decisions. Although it is still somewhat unclear whether OAU decisions are
legally binding, AU decisions are. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the
st
Union, 1 Ord. Sess., art. 33 (July 2002), http://www.africa–union.org/rule
_prot/rules_Assembly.pdf. See also Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, The Status
of the Findings of the African Commission: From Moral Persuasion to Legal
Obligation, 48 J. AFR. L. 1, 9–10 (2004); OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 9.
70. See Viljoen & Louw, supra note 69, at 2.
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Conversely, the decisions of the African Court are final.
They will not be subject to appeal (to any other judicial institution) or to political confirmation (by any body of the OAU/AU).72
The consequence is that these decisions will be unequivocally
binding on state parties.73 State parties will not only “undertake to comply with the judgment in any case to which they are
parties,” but also to “guarantee its execution.”74
B. Remedies: From Uncertainty to Clarity
The African Commission has no clear legal basis to create
remedies, which has led to inconsistent treatment in the pun75
ishment of African Charter violations. The African Commission’s remedies may be divided into three categories: no remedy, a very open-ended remedy,76 and a specific, detailed remedy.77 The omission of a remedy or the recommendation of an
open-ended remedy leaves uncertain what is required of states,
71. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 28(2). The only exception to finality is that the Court may review its own decision “in the light of
new evidence.” Id. art. 28(3). Other international courts have the same exception. See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 120(A), U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV. 1 (1995) (Request for
Review), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/rules/240404/240404.pdf.
See also Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR–97–19–AR72 (Mar.
31, 2000), available at www.ictr.org.
72. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 28(2).
73. Id. art. 30.
74. Id.
75. African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 55–59 (provisions dealing with
“other” (i.e., individual) communications make no mention of remedies). See
also Viljoen & Louw, supra note 69, at 10 (discussing remedies).
76. There are several instances in which the Commission has recently
found violations of the Charter, but left the issue of an appropriate remedy
completely open by failing to stipulate any remedy. See, e.g., Huri–Laws v.
th
Nigeria, Communication 225/98, 14 Ann. Activity Report of the Afr. Comm’n
th
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, annex V, at 57 (2000–2001) [hereinafter 14
Ann. Activity Report]; Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leonne, Communication
th
223/98, 14 Ann. Activity Report, annex V, at 43 (2000–2001).
77. See, e.g., The Soc. and Econ. Rights Action Ctr. and the Ctr. for Econ.
th
and Soc. Rights v. Nigeria, Communication 155/96, 15 Ann. Activity Report,
supra note 30, annex V, at 31 [hereinafter SERAC Case]; Communications
Filed Against the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Communications 54/91,
th
61/91, 98/93, 164/97–196/97, 210/98, 13 Ann. Activity Report, supra note 26,
annex V, addendum, at 138 (Commission consolidated communications filed
against the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and issued one ruling).
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thus impeding follow-up or implementation. For example, in
Communication 224/98, Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, the
respondent state was urged “to bring its laws in conformity with
the provisions of the [African] Charter.”78 The African Commission’s failure to define the term “in conformity” may have
been one of the reasons for Nigeria’s non-compliance. In contrast, there is a clear legal basis in the Protocol for the provision
of remedies, allowing the African Court to make “appropriate
orders to remedy the violation.”79
C. Implementation: From an Ad Hoc System to a
Comprehensive System
Given the non-binding nature of findings and the weak legal
basis for remedies under the Charter, it is hardly surprising
that implementation and enforcement of remedies has been
weak. The African Commission has not instituted any sort of
compliance system to gather information about states’ responses to the African Commission’s findings.80 Without the
required information, the African Commission has remained
passive with respect to the consequences of its findings.81
While the African Commission has adopted no systematic
compliance mechanism,82 some Commissioners have undertaken
limited follow-up on an ad hoc basis. The most notable example
th

78. Media Rights Agenda v. Nigeria, Communication 224/98, 14 Ann.
Activity Report, supra note 76, annex V, at 46.
79. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 27(1).
80. These insights are based on an evaluation of the activities of the African Commission, undertaken by the author in 2001. See Danish Centre for
Human Rights, Strengthening the Core Activities and Secretariat of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Evaluations and Reviews of
Partnership Programmes—No. 17, at 24 (2001), http://www.humanrights
.dk/upload/application/a66525ef/eandr17.pdf.
81. The Commission has, for example, not established any systematic
method for collecting information about states’ implementation of its recommendations, nor has it developed any records regarding measures taken by
states in compliance with its findings. The Commission’s practice differs from
that of the UN Human Rights Committee, which provides an annual report
noting the status of state compliance with its findings. Report of the Human
th
Rights Committee, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 57 Sess., Ch. 6, Followup Activities Under the Optional Protocol, at 118, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (Vol. I)
(2002), http://ods–dds–ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/668/60/IMG/N02668
60.pdf?OpenElement.
82. See OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 657.
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is Commissioner Jainaba Johm’s questions to state parties regarding their implementation of decisions on individual communications during examination of state reports.83 Another example includes a recommendation, made as part of a remedy,
that the state party discuss implementation of the decision in
its periodic report.84 Additionally, remedies ordered in other
decisions imply that some sort of follow-up will be undertaken.85
Conversely, state parties to the Protocol specifically undertake to implement the findings, including ordered remedies.86
Institutional or systematic control over enforcement is provided
in that the Executive Council must be notified of judgments and
must monitor their execution on behalf of the Assembly.87 In its
annual report to the Assembly, the African Court must specify
instances of state non-compliance.88 Non-compliance may result
in an AU decision, which in turn may lead to the imposition of
sanctions as envisaged under the AU Constitutive Act.89
D. Accessibility: From Secrecy to Openness
Confidentiality obscures the protective work of the African
Commission. The requirement that “all measures taken” by the
African Commission remain confidential until approved by the
Assembly has been interpreted to include any information
about individual communications.90 Sessions of the African
91
Commission are therefore divided into public and private. The
public portion of their sessions deals with promotional issues,
th

83. See generally 15 Ann. Activity Report, supra note 30, annex 1 (indicating that states’ reports were considered by the African Commission during its
Thirty–first Ord. Sess.).
th
84. See Legal Res. Found. v. Zambia, Communication 211/98, 14 Ann.
Activity Report, supra note 76, annex V, at 86 (remedy ordered).
85. See, e.g., SERAC Case, supra note 77.
86. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 30.
87. Id. art. 29(2).
88. Id. art. 31.
89. See Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/23.15, art. 23(2) (entered into force May 26, 2001) [hereinafter AU
Constitutive Act], http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm.
90. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 59(1).
91. See Frans Viljoen, Introduction to the African Commission and the
Regional Human Rights System, in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 1, at 358,
th
427 [hereinafter Introduction to the African Commission]. See generally 15
Ann. Activity Report, supra note 30 (for examples of Commission agendas).
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including the examination of state reports; the private portion,
which is closed to the public, deals mainly with communications.92 Because of this policy, decisions are often not accessible
and are not widely disseminated. Additionally, there is no systematic publication of the African Commission’s decisions.93
This excessive confidentiality is one of the factors contributing
to the low media profile and public awareness of the Commission in Africa.94
On the other hand, court proceedings in most countries are
usually open to the press and public;95 the African Court is no
96
different. Although the Protocol includes an exception allowing closed proceedings, in my view it is meant to be used only to
protect witnesses in situations where individuals, complainants, or witnesses are seriously threatened.97 A reasoned judgment has to be “read in open court.”98 All AU members must be
99
notified of decisions. However, no provision has been made for
the publication of these reports; although such provisions
should be covered in the Rules, there could be finance and resource implications. 100
92. See Viljoen, Introduction to the African Commission, supra note 91.
93. The Commission’s most recent decisions are accessible online, and are
reported in the Commission’s Annual Activity Reports. See www.achpr.org.
Additionally, the Institute for Human Rights and Development, an NGO
based in Banjul, The Gambia, has published a “Compilation of Decisions on
Communications of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.”
94. See ANKUMAH, supra note 5, at 38.
95. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMON LAW, COMMON
VALUES, COMMON RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON OUR COMMON HERITAGE BY
DISTINGUISHED BRITISH AND AMERICAN AUTHORS (2000) (discussing notions of
procedural fairness in common law systems, as well as the importance of public scrutiny in the common law system).
96. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 10(1). See also
Murray, Comparison Between the African and European Courts, supra note 5,
at 215. The African Court’s Rules of Procedure should clarify under which
circumstances in camera proceedings may take place. “Proceedings” should be
interpreted broadly to include court documents, such as pleadings; these
should be publicly accessible on the Court’s web site.
97. See JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERAMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 195–96 (2003) (for an analysis of a similar
exception in the Inter-American system).
98. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 28(5).
99. Id. art. 29(1).
100. Id. art. 28(6) (requiring that the African Court provide reasons for its
decisions, but not requiring publication).
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E. Pace of the Process: From Delayed to More Immediate
Justice?
The African Commission also has serious problems with delays in finalizing its communications.101 Often, a change of government has already taken place by the time the African Commission has reached a finding and recommended a remedy.102
For example, in the SERAC case, the delay between receipt of
the communication and entry of the final decision was five
years and seven months.103 To a very limited extent, the delay
could be attributed to the state party because of its obstruction
of the African Commission’s planned on-site mission to Nigeria.104 The complainant also contributed to the delay, as one
postponement was made “pending the receipt of written submissions from the Complainants.”105 However, most of the de101. See generally Dinah Shelton, Ensuring Justice with Deliberate Speed:
Case Management in the European Court of Human Rights and the United
States Courts of Appeals, 21 HUM. RTS. L. J. 337 (2000). Institutional delay
was one of the main justifications for the transformation of the European human rights system. The Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 11, establishing a
single European Court of Human Rights, describes the extent of the problem:
The backlog of cases before the Commission is considerable. At the
end of the Commission's session in January 1994, the number of
pending cases stood at 2,672, more than 1,487 of which had not yet
been looked at by the Commission. It takes on average over 5 years
for a case to be finally determined by the Court or the Committee of
Ministers. Also, whereas up to 1988 there were never more than 25
cases referred to the Court in one year, 31 were referred in 1989, 61
in 1990, 93 in 1991, 50 in 1992 and 52 in 1993, and it is probable that
the number will increase even more in the next few years ... .
Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11, supra note 17, at 948.
102. See Comité Cultural pour la Democratie au Benin v. Benin, Communith
cation 16/88, 8 Ann. Activity Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, para. 2 (1994–1995) (The Commission decided that “the present
government of Benin had satisfactorily resolved the issue of violations of huth
man rights under the previous administration.”) [hereinafter 8 Ann. Activity
Report], http: www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/ACHPR1.htm. See also Degli
th
v. Togo, Communication 83/92, 8 Ann. Activity Report, para. 5; Peoples’ Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism v. The Gambia, Comth
munication 44/90, 10 Ann. Activity Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and
th
Peoples’ Rights, at 65 (1996–1997) [hereinafter 10 Ann. Activity Report];
th
Huri–Laws v Nigeria, 14 Activity Report, supra note 76, at 57.
103. SERAC Case, supra note 77.
104. Id.
105. Id. para. 16.
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lays can be attributed to the African Commission: the discussion of the Nigeria mission report and “lack of time” are cited as
reasons why the case was postponed on only two occasions;106
more disconcerting are the numerous unexplained postponements.107
However, recourse to the African Court may mean more,
rather than less, delay. The supplementary nature of the African Court necessitates some duplication.108 Both the African
Commission and Court are required to deal with admissibility
and substantive questions,109 unless a case is submitted directly
110
The ability of complainants to make
to the African Court.
direct submissions to the African Court depends on whether a
state has made an optional declaration to that effect; the declaration is more the exception than the rule.111 However, once the
African Court has deliberated on a judgment, it must render its
written opinion within ninety days.112 Because state parties
must comply with the African Court’s judgment “within the
time stipulated by the Court,” the inference can be made that
the African Court will set timeframes for compliance and that
states will be required to abide by them.113 Nevertheless, requiring separate arguments and findings for two different institutions — the African Commission and the African Court — will
inevitably lead to delays. These types of excessive delay were
partially responsible for the merger of the European Commis106. Id. paras. 18–19. The mission took place from March 7–14, 1994; no
final report has been adopted. See also Viljoen, Overview of the African Regional Human Rights System, supra note 5, at 181.
107. SERAC Case, supra note 77, paras. 21–32 (several postponements from
th
th
the 24 to the 29 Session).
108. This argument has been crucial in transforming the European human
rights machinery into a single judicial institution. See generally CLARE OVEY
& ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the integration of European human rights
policies).
109. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 2, 3, 6.
110. Id. art. 34(6).
111. In fact, only one state party, Burkina Faso, has made such an art. 34(6)
declaration. See Jean-Baptiste Niyizurugero, Establishment of an African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: the Next Critical Stage, Association for
the Prevention of Torture, n.2, http://www.apt.ch/africa/court_judges.htm
#_ftnref2 (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
112. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 28(1).
113. Id. art. 30.
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114
This may well be the
sion and Court into one institution.
long-term solution for the African system if the coexistence of
the African Commission and the African Court produces similar
or even longer delays in finalizing cases.

F. Urgent Cases: From Inadequacy to Efficiency?
The African Charter does not provide for the adoption of interim or provisional measures.115 The African Commission’s
Rules of Procedure fill this lacuna by providing that the African
Commission may inform a state party on the “appropriateness
of taking provisional measures to avoid irreparable damage being caused to the victim of the alleged violation.”116 Such measures may be indicated by the African Commission or, when it is
not in session or in cases of urgency, by the Chair, in consultation with other members of the African Commission.117 The
Chair may take “any necessary action” in urgent cases, but
must report to the African Commission about action taken at
the next session.118 The African Commission has used this competence in a limited number of cases. For example, the African
Commission, based on a communication it received regarding
Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni leaders, adopted interim
measures asking the state (Nigeria) not to execute them until
the Commission had made a decision.119 The Nigerian govern120
ment did not comply, and in its subsequent decision the African Commission indicated that it considers interim measures
binding on a state party.121 However, the African Commission’s
regular procedure lacks a mechanism for dealing with communications of an urgent nature.122
114. See Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11, supra note 17, at 944.
115. African Charter, supra note 1 (no provisions for the adoption of interim
measures).
116. Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, R. 111(1).
117. Id. R. 111(2).
118. Id. R. 111(3).
119. Int’l Pen v. Nigeria, Communications 137/94, 139/94, 154/96, 161/97,
th
12 Ann. Activity Report, supra note 54, at 65 (Communications consolidated
because all concerned the trial and detention of Ken Saro-Wiwa).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 72–73.
122. The following communications illustrate that the Commission lacks a
mechanism for dealing with urgent matters. See Organisation Mondiale Conth
tre la Torture v. Rwanda, Communications 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93, 10
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Under the Protocol, the African Court has a broad mandate to
adopt “such provisional measures as it deems necessary” in
cases “of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to
avoid irreparable harm to persons.”123 The issue is whether the
“adopted measures” are “judgments” that parties have undertaken to execute to be monitored by the AU Executive Council
on behalf of the Assembly. The Protocol should be interpreted
to include those measures. “Findings,” as defined in Article 27
(for example, a finding of violation, a remedy, or a provisional
measure) are the dispositive part of the “judgment.” The terms
“finding” and “judgment” are not mutually exclusive. The African Court could clarify this apparent uncertainty by denoting
its “finding” on provisional measures as a “judgment,” an avenue followed in the other regional systems.124
G. Profile: From Obscurity to Visibility?
Despite the vastness of the African continent and the frequency of human rights reports and allegations, very few com125
At the
munications have reached the African Commission.
domestic level, many factors account for this small caseload,
among them illiteracy, political instability or war, absence of
civil society, lack of legal aid, lack of access to justice, onerous
local remedies, dysfunctional court systems, and corruption.
Commission-level factors are also responsible. The African
Commission has been ineffective in disseminating information
about its existence and its case law126 and has failed to exploit

Ann. Activity Report, supra note 102, at 49–56 (African Commission failed to
issue findings on consolidated communications, submitted from 1989 to 1992
alleging violations against members of the Tutsi group, until Oct. 1996, some
seven years after submission of the first communication).
123. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 27(2).
124. Cf. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, at 506, ¶ 109 (June
27) (where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that interim measures under art. 41 of its Statute are binding); Mamatkalov v. Turkey, App.
Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 6, 2003), http://www.
ehcr.coe.int/eng.
125. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
126. See Danish Centre for Human Rights, supra note 80, at 43. The African Commission activated an official website and began publishing its decisions on it in 2001, significantly improving the dissemination of information.
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127
Some of the Commission’s inmedia exposure possibilities.
adequacies, however, may be a result of its lack of resources
and its seat in far-off Banjul.
To some extent, the mere existence of the African Court
should generate greater media interest and exposure. A continental court is bound to have a much clearer identity in the
minds of Africans. Ultimately, however, the African Court itself
will have earned its legitimacy by securing a high profile
through the accessibility and transparency of its procedures,
the quality of its judgments and the fairness of its findings.

III. THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE THE COURT
The coexistence of the African Court with the African Commission means that Africa will have a two-tiered human rights
system, similar to the Inter-American system and the European
system before Protocol No. 11’s entry into force in 1998.128 The
Protocol describes the relationship between the two bodies as
complementary and mutually reinforcing.129 Although the African Court may deal with individual and inter-state cases and
has both contentious and advisory jurisdiction, this section will
focus mainly on individual cases and contentious proceedings,
where the rights of individuals are most at stake.130 The following issues specifically affecting individuals before the African
Court are discussed here: standing to bring cases and the in-

127. See ANKUMAH, supra note 5, at 38–39 (African Commission’s restrictive
interpretation of confidentiality principle featured in African Charter, art. 59,
contributes to public’s lack of exposure to, and resultant lack of confidence in,
Commission decisions). See also Danish Centre for Human Rights, supra note
80, at 34–35 (“Generally, interviewees agree that this is the worst area of the
Commissioner’s (and its Secretariat’s) work, and one in which very little progress can be[] identified. The Secretariat has not … consistently secured the
presence of journalists at sessions, and has not organised a workshop for journalists to promote the African Charter.”).
128. See generally Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11, supra note 17.
129. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, pmbl. & art. 2.
130. Although the African Court has jurisdiction over inter-state complaints, states must still submit their complaints against other states to the
Commission. Assuming that the African Commission determines that the
case is admissible and that there is a violation on the merits, the Commission
or one of the state parties, either the state lodging the complaint or the state
against which the complaint had been lodged, may submit the case to the
Court. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(b) & (c).
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volvement of individuals in proceedings before the African
Court.
A. Standing in Contentious Cases: Submission of Individual
Complaints to the Court
Article 5(1) of the Protocol allows the following parties to
submit contentious cases to the African Court: “(a) The Commission; (b) The State Party which has lodged a complaint to
the Commission; (c) The State Party against which the complaint has been lodged at the Commission; (d) The State Party
whose citizen is a victim of human rights violation; (e) African
Intergovernmental Organizations.”131 In addition, Article 5(3)
provides that “[t]he Court may entitle relevant NGOs with observer status before the Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in accordance with Article 34(6) of
this Protocol.”132 Article 34(6) stipulates that “[a]t the time of
the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the State
shall make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court
to receive cases under Article 5(3).”133
Thus, there are two roads leading to the African Court. The
main road runs through the African Commission. Individuals
are not allowed to lift the barrier (i.e., by “submitting cases”)
that separates Commission and Court; the African Commission
and the respondent state act as gatekeepers. The second road
leads directly to the African Court, and bypasses the African
Commission. However, only states may permit complainants to
bypass the African Commission by making an Article 34(6) declaration to that effect.134 So far, only one of the nineteen ratify135
ing states has made such a declaration. Because the optional
declaration allowing direct access to the African Court is the
exception rather than the rule, most cases reaching the African
Court will start as communications to the African Commission.
Once before the African Commission, however, individuals seem

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. art. 5(1)(a)(b)(c) & (d).
Id. art. 5(3).
Id. art. 34(6).
Id. art. 34(6).
See Niyizurugero, supra note 111.
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to lose the capacity to influence the fate of their cases and, as a
consequence, to impact the African Court’s agenda.136
If strengthening the complaints’ mechanism to overcome deficiencies inherent in the African Commission’s findings is the
rationale for establishing the African Court, then the Court
should be allowed to play as important a role as possible.137 Put
another way, as many communications as possible should be
able to reach the African Court. How appropriate is it, then, to
rely on states against whom complaints have been lodged (respondent states) and the African Commission to set the process
in motion?
1. Respondent States – Article 5(1)(c)
Reliance on respondent states is unlikely to unleash the African Court’s potential. If the African Commission continues to
favor individuals, states will probably “appeal” the African
Commission’s findings before the African Court on the grounds
that the African Commission violated the Charter. If this happens in cases where the African Commission finds a violation by
the state, the referral of matters to the African Court will depend on the initiative of respondent states. However, states
may be reluctant to submit cases to the African Court because
of the binding nature of its decisions. In other words, states
may prefer the certainty of a non-binding finding against them
over the possibility of a binding decision against them. Moreover, there seems to be little incentive for states prevailing at
the Commission level to submit to a potentially disadvantageous Court judgment.
2. The Commission – Article 5(1)(a)
Because individuals or NGOs who submit complaints have no
competence to refer matters and states are unlikely to do so, it
is left to the African Commission to refer matters. The InterAmerican experience illustrates the risk of relying on the African Commission to refer cases to the African Court. Although
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American
136. Id.
137. See Murray, Comparison Between the African and European Courts,
supra note 5, at 213 (arguing that the Court should be supplied with “a regular list of cases”).
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Court) was established in 1980, it did not receive its first contentious case until 1986,138 followed by its second in 1990.139
Since the Protocol does not explicitly require that the African
Commission make findings on the admissibility and merits of a
case before submitting it to the African Court,140 three possibilities present themselves. First, the African Commission may
submit a case to the African Court without making any findings
at all. Second, it could submit a case after making some findings, for example, after it had made a finding of fact, a finding
on admissibility, or after unsuccessfully trying to negotiate a
friendly settlement. Finally, the African Commission could
submit a case to the African Court after its final disposition,
i.e., a finding on the merits or a friendly settlement. This Article will now consider the following three Scenarios.
Scenario 1: In the first scenario, the African Commission
could act as a mere conduit to the African Court. After a preliminary hearing at the Commission level, the African Court
could decide on both admissibility and the merits of the case, or
try to reach an amicable settlement.141 The African Court could
also “overrule” the African Commission and remand the case to
the Commission for additional findings.142
This course would provide the type of access, best described
as “Commission-mediated direct access,” similar to that of a
complainant in a domestic court seeking direct access to the
highest Constitutional Court without first exhausting the usual
domestic constitutional remedies.143 Under South African constitutional law, for example, lower courts may be bypassed and

138. See generally Case 7920, Inter–Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. L/V/II.68, doc. 8
rev 1 (1986), available at http://www.cidh.org.
139. David J. Padilla, An African Human Rights Court: Reflections from the
Perspective of the Inter–American System, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 185, 191 n. 22
(2002).
140. See generally Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1.
141. Id. arts. 6(2) & 9.
142. See id. art. 6(3) (stating that “[t]he Court may consider cases or transfer them to the Commission”).
143. See Rules of the Constitutional Court, Government Notice (GN) R1603
of 31 Oct. 2003, R. 17(2) (S. Afr.) (effective Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Rules of
the Constitutional Court], available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/rules.html
(last visited Aug. 1, 2004).
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a matter may be referred directly to the Constitutional Court if
it is “in the interests of justice” to do so.144
The travaux préparatoires of the Protocol suggest that another consideration is the importance and urgency of the matter, such as allegations of serious or massive human rights violations.145 Frivolous and baseless complaints should not be allowed direct access to the African Court. However, Commission-mediated direct access would also eliminate the African
Commission’s role in resolving the communication. Therefore,
the criteria for direct referral to the African Court depends not
only on the urgency of the matter, but also the ramifications of
omitting the role of the African Commission.
For some matters, the African Commission’s role may be very
important. For example, it may be argued that judicial officers
are, by their nature, training, and experience, less equipped to
deal with on-site investigations and negotiations than are
quasi-judicial officers. If this is true, the African Commission
would have an advantage in negotiating friendly settlements
and would be better situated to conduct fact-finding, especially
in situations where there have been massive violations that require on-site investigations.146 Therefore, the African Commission’s role should not be diminished in matters where these two
144. Id. R. 18(1)–(2). In Bruce v. Fleecytez Johannesburg CC, the South
African Constitutional Court held that direct access is exceptional and indicated that a complainant’s prospects of success and the desirability of a court
not to “sit as a court of first and last instance,” especially where no further
appeal is available, played a part in its decision. 1998 (2) SALR 1143 (CC),
paras. 7–8. In Germany, complainants in constitutional matters may approach the Bundesverfasssungsgericht (German Constitutional Court) directly, but only in exceptional circumstances, i.e., when the Court determines
that the matter is of general importance or that serious and unavoidable disadvantage to the complainant would otherwise result. Gesetz über das
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Bundesverfassungsgerichts–Gesetz, BVerfGG),
12.3.1951 (BGBl. I S.243), art. 90(2) (Federal Constitutional Court Act)
(amended July 16, 1998), http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BVerfGG.htm.
145. In an earlier draft of the Protocol, which lacked the provision allowing
states to make an optional declaration allowing individuals direct access to
the court, the African Court was to have the discretion to allow direct access
in “urgent cases or serious, systematic or massive violations of human rights.”
Nouakchott Draft Protocol, supra note 49, art. 6(1).
146. See, e.g., Frans Viljoen, Some Arguments in Favour of and Against an
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in THE AFRICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 21, 43
(A.V. Lowe et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Some Arguments in Favour].
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functions are at play. Instead, these two functions would be
best performed not by judicial institutions, such as the African
Court, but by quasi-judicial bodies like the African Commission
where formality is less important and ad hoc procedures are
more common.
In the pre-1998 European system, the European Commission
fulfilled fact-finding functions.147 Although the European Court
148
was entitled to engage in its own fact-finding, it did so only in
149
“exceptional circumstances.”
The European experience also
demonstrates that friendly settlement is frequently a commission, not a court, role.150 By contrast, the Inter-American Court
has been much more extensively involved in fact-finding.151
Oral proceedings before the Inter-American Court form an important part of this process.152 Although the Inter-American
Court has indicated that fact-finding is primarily the role of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, it has nevertheless reviewed facts de novo.153 Indeed, the Inter-American Court
has held that it is the sole judicial body with decision-making
power, not a court of appeal for Commission decisions.154 How147. See Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 74 (1991)
[hereinafter Cruz Varas Case], http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.
asp?skin=hudoc–en (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
148. See Kertsen Rogge, Fact–finding, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 677 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993) (discussing Rules 41 through 46 of the 1992 version of Rules of Court for the
European Court).
149. See Cruz Varas Case, supra note 147, para. 74.
150. From 1955 to 1991, approximately twelve percent of all cases (128
cases) before the European Commission were settled amicably; in the European Court, only twenty–nine friendly settlements (term includes all cases
“dropped as a result of actions taken by those who were involved in the case”)
were reached between 1962 and 1991. Alexandre Kiss, Conciliation, in THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 703, 704–05 (R. St.
J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993).
151. See Victor Rodriguez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The Development of
the Inter-American Human Rights System: A Historical Perspective and a
Modern-Day Critique, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 593, 629 (2000).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, para. 29 (June 26, 1987) (“The Court does not act
as a court of review, of appeal or other similar court in its dealings with the
Commission. Its power to examine and review all actions and decisions of the
Commission derives from its character as sole judicial organ in matters con-
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ever, the Inter-American Court is unlikely to use its power to
conduct on-site investigations.155
Domestic courts engage in both settlement and fact-finding
activities.156 Indeed, with the exception of appellate courts,
most domestic courts engage in fact-finding on a daily basis.157
This demonstrates that there is nothing inherent in the judicial
function that makes either fact-finding or dispute settlement
inappropriate.158 To some extent, the three regional human
rights courts all have settlement and fact-finding functions. In
particular, under the African system, the Protocol’s direct access provision implies that the African Court will have to engage in both fact-finding and settlement without the African
Commission’s intervention.159 These activities are therefore inescapably part of the African Court’s functions. In any event,
the African Commission has not dealt very effectively with fact-

cerning the Convention.”), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriecpdf_ing/seriec_
01_ing.pdf.
155. The Inter-American Court’s competence to conduct on–site investigations is implicitly granted by its Statute. Statute of the Inter-American Court
th
on Human Rights, Oct. 31, 1979, O.A.S. Res. 448, 9 Sess., art. 3 (entered into
force Jan 1, 1980) [hereinafter Statute of the Inter-American Court], http:
cidh.oas.org/basicos/basic17.htm. See also In re Viviana Gallardo, Advisory
Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. G 101/81, para. 22 (Nov. 13, 1981)
(advisory opinion requested by the government of Costa Rica), http://
www.corteidh.or.cr/seriea_ing/index.html.
[A]lthough the Court, as any other judicial organ, does not lack the
power to carry out its own investigations, particularly if these are
necessary to provide the Court with the information it needs to discharge its functions, the Convention entrusts to the Commission the
initial phase of the investigation into the allegations. The Commission also has a conciliatory function empowering it to propose friendly
settlements as well as to make the appropriate recommendations to
remedy the violation it has found to exist. It is also the body to which
the States concerned initially provide all the pertinent information
and submissions.
Id.
156. See generally Professeur Pierre Met, Introduction to the
English Legal System (2002), http://www.u–psud.fr/SCEAUX/enseignement/
R.nsf/els.htm?OpenPage (describing the function of courts in a common law
system).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See generally Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 34(6).
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160
Its findings are often factually weak; additionally,
finding.
the African Commission has been very reluctant to secondguess the factual findings of a domestic court.161
Moreover, neither the Charter nor the Rules of Procedure accords the African Commission any role with regard to friendly
settlement procedure.162 There are also very few instances
where the African Commission has attempted to negotiate settlements. Because the African Commission lacks expertise and
experience in this area, settlement should not be considered a
consistent part of its practice.163 Indeed, it has no legal competence to settle cases. The Protocol states that the African Court
“may try to reach an amicable settlement” in cases before it “in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.”164 The relevant
provision of the Charter, Article 48, read with Article 47 and
supplemented by Rule 98 of the Rules of Procedure, relates only
to inter-state communications, thus restricting settlement efforts for state parties involved in those disputes.165 This means
that even the African Court has limited authority with regard
to settlement negotiations. However, even if this strict reading
of the Protocol is adopted, the African Court is still likely to engage in settlement negotiations, scrutinizing and formalizing
any agreement parties reach after referral of the case.166 There-

160. See Rachel Murray, Evidence and Fact–finding by the African Commission, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN
PRACTICE, 1986–2000 100, 101–10 (Malcolm Evans & Rachel Murray eds.,
2002) [hereinafter Evidence and Fact–finding].
th
161. See Bob Ngozi Njoku v. Egypt, Communication 40/90, 11 Ann. Activity
Report of the Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, at 27, para. 60
(1997–1998) (“It does not however beho[o]ve the Commission to judge the
th
facts. This is the responsibility of the Egyptian Courts.”) [hereinafter 11
Ann. Activity Report].
162. See OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 641.
163. See id. at 642–46 (analyzing the African Commission’s limited role in
settlement).
164. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 9.
165. See African Charter, supra note 1, art. 48.
166. See Vincent Berger, Le règlement amiable devant la Cour europeénne
des Droits de l’Homme, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN
DIMENSION: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF GÉRARD J. WIARDA 55–56 (1988) (discussing instances in which the European Court has handed down judgments formalising friendly settlements or agreements between parties). The InterAmerican Court plays a relatively passive role in friendly settlement. See
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art. 54
(2000) (amended Dec. 2003) (providing that the Court may strike cases from
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fore, “in accordance with the provisions of the Charter” could be
interpreted to refer to the content of the agreement between the
parties. Thus, as long as a case is before it, the African Court
may try to reach a friendly settlement, but must ensure that
the settlement is human rights friendly and comports with the
Charter.167
It thus follows that many cases may be directly submitted to
the African Court without undermining the African Commission’s role. In this scenario, the exhaustion of local remedies
would also be relevant to the African Commission’s decision.168
Commission-mediated direct access arguably amounts to a de
facto “declaration in terms of article 34(6)”169 for states that had
not made any de jure declaration, giving rise to a situation
where individuals could submit complaints to the African Court
against states not accepting direct submissions, thus sidestepping the clear requirements of the Protocol.170 A response to
this argument, however, is that a declaration under Article
34(6) is made explicitly, for all cases, and that Commissionmediated direct access is exceptional and relates to the exigencies of a particular case without implying general acceptance.
Moreover, Article 5 allows the African Commission to submit
cases to the African Court without stipulating to either the ad-

its list when “parties to a case before the Court” inform it of the existence of a
friendly settlement) [hereinafter Inter-American Court Rules of Procedure],
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/general_ing/rules.html; Rules of Procedure of the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, art. 41(1) (2000) (amended
Dec. 2003) (requiring the Commission to put itself “at the disposal of the parties concerned”) [hereinafter Inter-American Commission Rules of Procedure],
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic16.htm.
167. See Kiss, supra note 150, at 705 (procedure for friendly settlement in
European system “based upon Rule 49 of the present Rules of the [European]
Court”).
168. See African Charter, supra note 1, art. 56(5) (requiring the exhaustion
of local remedies).
169. See Viljoen & Louw, supra note 69, at 3.
170. The Protocol does not explicitly provide that all cases must be decided
by the African Commission before their submission to the Court. However, if
the Commission submits all cases directly to the Court under art. 5(1) without
making any findings, the optional declaration mechanism under art. 34(6)
would be rendered unnecessary. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note
1, arts. 5(1), 34(6).
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171

missibility or the merits of the case. In any event, the African
Court is competent to deal with both admissibility and merit.172
Allowing for Commission-mediated direct access is the method
best suited to give effect to the Preamble to the Protocol, (which
links the African Court to the “achievement of the legitimate
aspirations of the African peoples”)173 and does not detract from
the Court’s main purpose of complementing and reinforcing the
African Commission.174 Adopting this course would also reduce
duplication and delays, important goals in a resourceconstrained environment, and would guarantee greater “equality of arms” between the state and individual.175 Still, this
should be seen as an exceptional way of reaching the African
Court, not the rule.
Scenario 2: The African Commission could adopt a more fluid
approach and submit a case to the African Court after partial
review. This would require the African Commission to conduct
admissibility findings.176 If such a course is adopted, the African
system should emulate the European system; that is, the African Commission should not refer cases it has found to be inadmissible.177

171. Id. art. 5 (silent as to any requirements African Commission must fulfil
before submitting cases to the Court).
172. Id. art. 3.
173. Id. pmbl.
174. See id.
175. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 9 to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 140, para. 13 (opened for signature Nov. 6, 1990) (repealed by
Protocol No. 11 on Nov. 1, 1998) (arguing that change in European Convention
is warranted because states and non–state applicants lacked equal access to
the European Court), http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/Html/140.
htm.
176. The African Court can still conduct admissibility findings. In fact, the
grounds upon which the Court may base its admissibility findings are broader
than the African Commission’s; unlike the Commission, the Court is not compelled to “base” its findings on the grounds established in art. 56 of the Charter, but need only take them into account. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 6(2).
177. H.C. Krüger & C.A. Nørgaard, The Right of Application, in THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 657, 674–75 (R. St.
J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993) (describing how the European system works).
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The African Commission could also conduct fact-finding and,
if applicable, settlement negotiations.178 The African Commission’s role would be expanded from that described in scenario
one; the African Commission would have the additional authority to refer matters to the African Court after making findings
of fact, but before considering the merits. Proceedings before
the African Court would then deal primarily with legal, rather
than factual, questions. The Protocol does not exclude this possibility.179 While such an approach would necessitate improvement of the African Commission’s fact-finding techniques, it
could also be advantageous. It could lead to a more efficient
division of labor, fewer delays, and a better use of resources
since witnesses would only testify once and only one set of arguments and pleadings would be required.180 In my opinion,
such practical concerns will determine the viability of the coexistence of the Court and the Commission. This proposal thus
differs from both the Inter-American and pre-Protocol No. 11
European systems by suggesting a solution appropriate to the
African context.
To some extent, this scenario mirrors the Inter-American system, where the Inter-American Commission may refer a matter
to the Inter-American Court after failing to reach a friendly settlement.181 In an advisory opinion resulting from a refusal by
178. See generally Murray, Evidence and Fact–finding, supra note 160. See
also OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 641–46.
179. The African Court’s main role is to determine if there has been a violation of the African Charter. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1,
art. 27(1) (this provision, entitled “findings,” permits the Court to make orders
to remedy human rights violations). It appears that the Court’s proceedings
need not include factual inquiries, and could instead be restricted to questions
of law. See id. art. 10. This possibility is supported by the language in art.
26, which states that the Court “shall hear submissions by all parties” and
hold enquiries only “if deemed necessary.” Id. art 26(1).
180. See Murray, Comparison Between African and European Courts, supra
note 5, at 198–99 (noting that in the pre–Protocol No. 11 European system,
there was a presumption that the European Commission was primarily responsible for fact–finding). Murray argues that “a delegation of responsibility
between a Commission that deals with disputes of facts and a Court which
looks at cases of disputes of law … might be useful for the African system.”
Id.
181. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 51, 9
I.L.M. 673, 689. (When a settlement is not reached in the Inter–American
system, art. 51 allows the Inter–American Commission to “set forth its opin-
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the Inter-American Commission to refer a contentious case to
the Court, the Inter-American Court held that the Convention
does not require “that the Commission determine that the Convention has been violated before the case may be referred by it
to the Court.”182 According to the Inter-American Court, factors
such as the controversial nature of the issue, the novelty of the
issue, and the general importance of the issue to the hemisphere
183
at large may play a role in a decision to refer. To be clear, this
scenario proposes that the African Commission submit to the
African Court in as many cases as possible. Urgency need not
be a criterion, thus making submission the rule rather than the
exception.
Scenario 3: Under the third scenario, the African Commission would finalize communications before submitting them to
the African Court. The Protocol “appear[s] to suggest” that the
Commission will only refer cases after considering them, “thus
following the approach of the previous European organs”184 and
that of the Inter-American organs. Under the Inter-American
system, the state is given a fixed term within which it must
comply with the remedy.185 After the term’s expiration, the Inter-American Commission decides whether adequate measures
were taken.186 If the Inter-American Commission finds a failure
of state compliance, referral to the Inter-American Court is a
rebuttable presumption; the Inter-American Commission “shall
refer the case to the Court” unless it decides otherwise.187 When
the state prevails, the Inter-American Commission has a “speion and conclusions” and then vote on whether that report should be published. Implicit in this is that the Inter–American Commission, as part of its
art. 51 obligations, can submit the matter to the Inter–American Court.)
[hereinafter American Convention].
182. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the
Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29, American Convention on Human
Rights), Advisory Opinion OC–5/85, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5, para.
24 (1985) [hereinafter Compulsory Membership Case].
183. Id. para. 25.
184. Murray, Comparison Between the African and European Courts, supra
note 5, at 198 (arguing that based on art. 8 of the Protocol, the rules of the
Court should be adopted “bearing in mind the complementarity between the
Commission and the Court”).
185. American Convention, supra note 181, art. 51(2).
186. Id. art. 51(3).
187. Inter–American Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 166, art.
44.
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cial duty to consider the advisability of coming to the Court,”
especially since the individual has no standing to take the matter further.188
Initially, the European system did not allow individuals to
submit cases to the Court.189 However, Protocol No. 9 to the
European Convention changed this policy and provided that
“the person, non-governmental organisation or group of persons
having lodged the complaint with the Commission” could also
refer cases to the European Court in their own name and without the mediating presence of the European Commission.190
This referral was only provisional; a three-judge panel, including the judge from the state complained against, had to give its
approval.191 The panel was to consider whether the matter
raised a serious question of interpretation or application, but
could also reject referral “for any other reason.”192
Thus far, the African Commission has decided in favor of individuals in most cases.193 Should the African Commission
submit these cases to the African Court? Although there is an
argument that all such cases should be referred to ensure that
the recommendatory findings of the Commission are converted
into legally binding decisions,194 the state should be allowed an
opportunity to comply with the African Commission’s finding
188. Compulsory Membership Case, supra note 182, para. 26.
189. See European Convention, supra note 17, art. 25.
190. Protocol No. 9 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 6, 1990, art. 5, 30 I.L.M. 693, 694
(entered into force Oct. 1, 1994) [hereinafter Protocol No. 9].
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. In the first eleven years of its existence, the African Commission made
final decisions on the merits in seventeen cases. Fifteen violations were
found, and the Commission only found in favor of the state in two cases. See
Viljoen, Overview of the African Regional Human Rights System, supra note 5,
at 170–74. The Commission’s tendency to find in favor of individuals has
continued (at least through the end of 2001). See Viljoen, Introduction to the
African Commission, supra note 91, at 446–53.
194. In the pre-1998 European system, all admissible cases ended in final
decisions, either by their submission to the European Court, or in binding
decisions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. See European Convention, supra note 17, art. 32. In the African system, the AU Executive Council is empowered to monitor the African Court’s judgements, but
not the African Commission’s findings. These findings remain “recommendations” unless the AU Assembly confers legal status on them by “adopting”
them. See Viljoen & Louw, supra note 69, at 9–10.
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before the matter is referred to the African Court if compliance
is the primary goal. This procedure would reflect the practice of
the Inter-American Commission whereby, in the absence of
compliance, the Inter-American Commission refers cases automatically to the Inter-American Court, unless there is a “reasoned decision” to the contrary.195 However, this could lead to
further delays, would require improvement of the African
Commission’s monitoring and follow-up procedure, and may be
manipulated by states.
On the other hand, states are unlikely to subject cases decided against individuals to further scrutiny. The African
Commission should, therefore, refer all cases decided against
individuals to the African Court, unless some exceptional circumstance, such as manifest lack of substance, is present. If
the African Commission adopted a standard requiring a “likelihood of success” for such referrals, the process could become too
burdensome and lead to subjectivity in its findings. However,
the African Commission could decide that resources and time
should be prioritized for cases with a “good chance of winning”196
so as not to harm the public perception of the African Court and
trigger the development of a negative jurisprudence.
3. State Party Citizen – Victim: Article 5(1)(d)
A state may also submit a case to the African Court when one
of its citizens “is a victim of human rights violation.”197 Because
the Protocol does not also state that the citizen should have
“lodged a complaint” with the African Commission as the other
two sub-articles dealing with state submission do,198 the word
“is” implies that there is some “objective truth.”
One interpretation is that this “objective truth” is equivalent
to the state’s viewpoint. Therefore, this provision opens the
door for states to submit cases directly to the African Court if
the rights of its citizens are, in its opinion, violated by another
state. Thus, some inter-state complaints, namely those which
involve citizens, would be privileged, and the inter-state com195.
43(2).
196.
197.
198.

Inter–American Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 166, art.
Padilla, supra note 139, at 191.
Protocol of the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(d).
Id. art. 5(1)(b)–(c).

File: Viljoen Macro 122704.doc

36

Created on: 12/27/2004 3:47 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 12/27/2004 3:48 PM

[Vol. 30:1

plaints system provided for under the Charter would be overridden.
Another interpretation that fits better with the term “is a victim” is that the African Commission must have made a finding
that the individual is, indeed, a victim. This is not satisfactory,
as it would allow states to submit cases to the African Court
only when the Commission has found a violation. If this interpretation is adopted, states must be willing to refer matters on
behalf of their citizens, otherwise the African Court will not
have jurisdiction.
It is possible that the drafters’ intention was only to emulate
the pre-Protocol No. 11 European Convention, which allowed a
state “whose national is alleged to be a victim” to refer a case to
the European Court.199 Soering v. U.K presents a typical illustration of this provision’s application: the applicant, a German
national, lodged a complaint against the United Kingdom,
where he was residing at the time of the complaint. 200 After the
European Commission’s final report had been adopted and
transferred to the Committee of Ministers, the Commission,
respondent United Kingdom, and the German government successively referred the case to the European Court.201

199. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 48.
200. See generally Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989).
201. It was referred by the European Commission on Jan. 25, 1989; the
United Kingdom on Jan. 30, 1989; and Germany on Feb. 3, 1989. See LUKE
CLEMENTS, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE CONVENTION
th
74 (1994). See also Bob Ngozi Njoku v. Egypt, Communication 40/90, 11 Ann.
Activity Report, supra note 161, at 27 (illustrating the potential usefulness of
a provision allowing a state, whose citizen is an alleged victim, to refer a case
to the African Court). A Nigerian national who was arrested while in the
“transit zone” of Cairo Airport, and who was charged, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment on a drug–related offence in Egypt, directed a
complaint to the Commission. Reluctant to interfere with the factual findings
of the Egyptian courts, the Commission concluded that there was no violation
of the African Charter. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the
Commission or Egypt would have submitted the case to the Court, but Nigeria
might have, had art. 5(1)(d) of the Protocol been in place at the time. See id.
para. 60.
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4. African Intergovernmental Organizations—Article 5(1)(e)
African intergovernmental organizations may also submit
202
cases to the African Court. One such institution is the African
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
(African Children’s Committee),203 the implementing body of the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child
(African Children’s Charter). After finalizing a case, the African Children’s Committee has the same competence as the African Commission to refer cases to the African Court.204 It is possible that other intergovernmental organizations, such as regional economic arrangements, or even the AU itself, could
submit cases directly to the African Court under Article
5(1)(e).205 Arguably, this provision enables the AU to submit a
case against any AU member state so long as that state
breached the AU Charter or any other human rights treaty ratified by that state.206 Therefore, depending on the disputed subject matter, the AU may access either of the two courts to be
established under its auspices: the African Human Rights Court
for human rights violations or the African Court of Justice for
matters related to economic integration and politics.207

202. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(e).
203. See generally Amanda Lloyd, The First Meeting of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 2 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 320
(2002) (discussing the first meeting of the African Children’s Committee in
2002).
204. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(e).
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. This implies a judicial duality similar to that between the Strasbourg
and Luxembourg institutions in Europe. The AU Assembly adopted the Protocol of the Court of Justice on July 11, 2003. Protocol of the Court of Justice
of the African Union, June 11, 2003 (by July 31, 2004, four states had ratified
the Protocol, which requires 15 deposited ratifications entry into force) [hereinafter Protocol of the Court of Justice], http://www.africa–union.org
/home/welcome.htm. See generally Chris M. Peter, The Proposed African
Court of Justice–Jurisprudential, Procedural, Enforcement Problems and Beyond, 1 E. AFR. J. PEACE & HUM. RTS. 117 (1993) (for an early discussion of the
African Court of Justice). See also Nsongurua J. Udombana, An African Human Rights Court and an African Union Court: A Needful Duality or a Needless Duplication?, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 811 (2003) (discussing the duality of
the two African courts).
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5. Direct Access – Article 5(3)
State consent, taking the form of a declaration under Article
208
34(6), is a prerequisite for direct access to the African Court.
Although only one of the ratifying states has made an Article
34(6) declaration, the situation is not hopeless; state parties
may make such declarations “at any time” subsequent to ratification.209
The standing of individuals under the African Commission’s
Charter has been quite broad. The Charter does not have the
victim requirement found in other conventions (such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or
the European Convention),210 and allows individuals, groups or
NGOs to lodge communications.211 Cases that reach the African
Court after going through the African Commission must also
fulfill these requirements.212 However, the Protocol does not
208. Art. 34(6) provides: “At the time of ratification … or any time thereafter, the State shall make a declaration.” Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 34(6). Plain language advocates take issue with the word
“shall,” arguing that it is often unclear whether “shall” is used to denote a
future action or compulsion. The use of “shall” in the Protocol cannot express
compulsion, however, as the declaration is optional. To some extent it refers
to the future, but, in essence, “shall” seems to express a discretionary competence.
209. Id. It has been suggested that this provision allows ad hoc declarations
for the purpose of a particular case, or for a fixed period. It is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a state would make a case–specific declaration:
direct submission of cases depends on the initiative of the individual, who can
only commence an action if the state had already made the declaration. For a
state to make a case–specific declaration, it would need to foresee that an
individual intended to bring such a case. Period–specific declarations should
be discouraged, as they invite regression and uncertainty.
210. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm. Decision, J.H. v. Canada, Communication 187/85, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 230, U.N. Doc. A/40/40
(1985) (declaring the communication inadmissible due to a lack of any indication that “the author [had] himself been adversely affected”), available at
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/humanrts/undocs/session40/187–1985.htm
(last visited on Aug. 22, 2004); Kertsen Rogge, Examining the Merits of Human Rights Applications—The Legal Issues, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1215, 1217 (Paul Mahoney et al., eds., 2000) (noting that art. 34 of the European Convention states that “the individual applicant must be a ‘victim’ of the alleged violation”).
211. See American Convention, supra note 181, art. 44 (broad provision
permitting “any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity” to
lodge petitions with the Inter-American Commission).
212. See OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 732.
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contain any language regarding cases brought directly to the
African Court. Accordingly, it should not be construed as restrictive of victims’ access to the African Court.
Direct access is restricted to NGOs “with observer status before the Commission.”213 The African Commission has granted
observer status to over 400 NGOs, both African and international.214 Although most cases submitted to the African Commission have been submitted by NGOs enjoying observer
status,215 cases can also be brought in the name of an individual
when the NGO does not have observer status.216
Article 5(3) provides that the African Court “may entitle” individuals to submit cases directly before it so long as the state
party has made an Article 34(6) declaration.217 This phrase
should not be read to give the African Court additional discretion to refuse hearing a case. Granting the African Court a discretionary power of refusal would be unduly burdensome on
individuals because they would be required to jump two procedural hurdles: the state’s acceptance of the optional Article
34(6) mechanism and the African Court’s discretionary approval. This discretionary language is rooted in the drafting
history of the Protocol and was introduced when direct access
was at the African Court’s discretion.218 However, since direct
213. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(3).
214. See African Commission, Directory of NGOs with Observer Status,
www.achpr.org/english/_info/directory_ngo_en.html (last visited Aug. 31,
2004).
215. NGOs enjoying observer status that have submitted communications in
their own name include Amnesty International, Civil Liberties Organisation
(Nigeria), Constitutional Rights Project (Nigeria), International Pen and the
Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme. NGOs without observer status,
including Centre for Independence of Judges and Lawyers, the Comité Culturel pour la Démocratie au Bénin and the Malawi African Association, have
also submitted communications. See id; OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, app. 7, at
907–17.
216. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 5(3).
217. Id.
218. See Draft Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, ICJ Draft Additional Protocol, AU Res. 230 (XXX), art. 20(1)
(Jan. 28, 1994) [hereinafter ICJ Draft Additional Protocol], http://www.
chr.up.ac.za/centre_publications/hrla/references/DOCUMENTS%20LEADING
%20UP%20TO%20THE%20ESTABLISHEMENT%20OF%20THE%20AFRICA
N%20COURT%20p.170.doc; Cape Town Draft Protocol, supra note 47, art.
6(1); Nouakchott Draft Protocol, supra note 49, art. 6(1).
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access became subject to an optional state declaration, the
drafters’ failure to remove the language appears to be a mere
oversight. Therefore, the provision should be interpreted to
place authorization for direct access “within the sole domain” of
state parties.219
The Protocol also restricts the competence of groups to bring
cases. 220 This seems counterintuitive, in the light of the peoples’
concept inherent in the Charter. If the rights of individuals and
peoples are the golden threads running through the Charter,
the standing requirements must reflect that. As this is excluded, this aspect should be clarified in the Rules of the Court.
B. Role of Individuals Before the Court
The African Commission’s Rules of Procedure require that respondent states and complainants submit written information
and observations on the admissibility and merits of the case,221
which allows the African Commission to consider the complainants’ arguments when making decisions.222 Additionally, despite the lack of any substantive provision within the Charter,
the African Commission generally allows individuals or NGOs
to be present at hearings or be represented during its consideration of communications lodged by those individuals or
NGOs.223 However, no provision has been made for legal aid or
for the awarding of costs in either the Charter or the Commission’s Rules of Procedure.
Individuals who bring a case directly before the African Court
are entitled, as a “party to a case,” to be represented by a legal
representative of their choice.224 But what about individuals
who have lodged communications with the African Commission
and whose cases are then submitted to the African Court, either
by the Commission or the state? Under these circumstances,
the individual remains “a party” to the case; the African Com219. OUGUERGOUZ, supra note 1, at 724.
220. Id. at 714–24 (discussing the jurisdiction of the African Court).
221. Rules of Procedure, supra note 25, R. 119 (stating the Commission’s
procedures for consideration of a communication).
222. Murray, Evidence and Fact-finding, supra note 160, at 102–03 (noting
that the Commission has relied primarily on written documents in making
decisions).
223. Id. at 104–06.
224. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 10(2).
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mission does not become a party to the case merely by submitting the case to the African Court, but, instead, initiates proceedings between the given parties before the Court. In the
dual European system, the European Commission’s function
was primarily to clarify and justify its own opinion and to ensure that all relevant information was placed before the European Court.225 The contention that the individual remains a
party seems logical in light of the fact that state parties may
refer cases to the African Court. It would be anomalous to accept that the individual loses its status as a party; it would
mean that only states may be parties. It follows that individuals, as parties to the case, are also “entitled to be represented by
a legal representative” of their choice when cases involving
them are submitted to the African Court by either a state or the
African Commission.226
This interpretation corresponds with developments under the
two other major human rights systems. Initially, neither the
European nor the Inter-American systems allowed individuals
to be present, nor be represented, or make representations to
their courts.227 Gradually, though, the individual’s role grew
and both systems allowed individuals the right to be present
and represented. Thus, individuals could make submissions
directly to the courts in both systems.228 In all but name, individuals were parties to the case.
Originally, the European Convention did not create a role for
complainants in the process before the European Court.229
Gradually, however, the European Commission, on a discretionary basis, allowed individual complainants to be present as
assistants to its lawyers.230 In its very first case, the European
225. See CLEMENTS, supra note 201, at 75.
226. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 10(2).
227. See American Convention, supra note 181, art. 57; Statute of the Inter–
American Court, supra note 155, art. 28.
228. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 97, at 20–21.
229. Under Rule 1 of the original Rules of the European Court, the complainant was not regarded as a “party” to the proceedings before the Court.
See CLEMENTS, supra note 201, at 75 (noting that the applicant’s status is
much improved under the current Rules).
230. Rule 33(3)(d) in the 1992 Rules of the European Court required the
European Court to ask applicants if they wished to participate in the proceedings, and, if so, to provide the particulars of their legal representatives. Under Rule 30(1) (also part of the 1992 Rules), applicants could be represented
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Court held that it should be informed of the applicant’s views.
In a decision ten years later, the European Court held that the
applicant’s lawyer could act as assistant to the European Commission’s delegates, but would “always [be] subject to the control and responsibility of the Delegates.”232 When the amended
Rules of Court became effective in 1983, the European Commission became legally obligated to inform applicants of their
rights and invite them to be represented at hearings.233
In the Inter-American system, a similar pragmatic approach
was adopted. The complainant’s lawyer was allowed to be part
of the Inter-American Commission’s legal team, and could “present the petitioner’s argument in that capacity, though only
under the control of the Commission.”234 However, serving as an
“assistant” on the Inter-American Commission’s team was not
ideal, as the interests and approach of the Inter-American
Commission “as guardian of the Convention assisting the
Court” and those of the complainant did not always coincide.235
Consequently, the Rules of Court for the Inter-American Court
were amended in 1996 to allow the victims’ representatives to
by appropriately qualified legal practitioners. See CLEMENTS, supra note 201,
at 75.
231. Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1960). Neither the
applicant nor his representative appeared—the Commission’s delegate presented these views as part of his oral submission at the Court’s hearing. See
Paul Mahoney, Developments in the Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights: The Revised Rules of Court, in 3 YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW
127, 129–30 (F. G. Jacobs ed., 1983).
232. De Wilde, Ooms, & Versyp v. Belgium, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8
(1970).
233. Rules of the European Court of Human Rights, R. 30(1) & 33(3)(d) (entered into force Apr. 20, 1992) (pre–Protocol No. 11) [hereinafter 1992 Rules of
European Court], reprinted in CLEMENTS, supra note 201, at 271–74.
234. David J. Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The Inter–
American Achievement, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1,
25 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998) (stating that the Commission may “hide a petitioner’s lawyer under its skirts”). Padilla, supra note
139, at 192 (By designating victims or NGOs as “legal advisors,” the Inter–
American Court essentially “permits the victim a place at the table alongside”
the Commission and “allows the victim to actively participate in the litigation
of the case.”).
235. Antônio Augusto Cançado Trinidade, The Inter-American Human
Rights System at the Dawn of the New Century: Recommendations for Improvement of its Mechanisms of Protection, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 395, 415 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998).
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present autonomous arguments “at the stage of reparations.”
The 1996 amendments created a strange situation: a complainant could lodge a case before the Inter-American Commission,
that is, be in complete control at the beginning of the case and
could make presentations at the reparations phase before the
Inter-American Court at the end of the case, but did not have
autonomous standing during the proceedings.237 Subsequent
amendments to the Rules in 2001, however, provided for complainant participation in all stages of the proceeding before the
Inter-American Court.238
The importance of the presence and participation of the individual, perhaps, boils down to the function of, and faith in, the
African Commission. Sir Humphrey Waldock has suggested
that the role of the African Commission in litigation before the
African Court is “not litigious: it is ministerial.”239 The African
Commission’s responsibility is to place the relevant elements of
the case before the African Court, not to defend the individual’s
case. This role should be juxtaposed with that of individuals
and their representatives. Rejecting an early challenge to an
individual’s presence at a hearing, the European Court said
that the European Commission, in its role as “defender of the
public interest,” must “make known the Applicant’s views to the
Court as a means of throwing light on the points at issue …
even if it does not share them.”240 Because “the whole of the
proceedings before the Court are upon issues which concern the
Applicant,” the Court held that it is “in the interests of the
proper administration of justice that the Court should have
knowledge” of the individual’s contentions.241 Therefore, in order to ensure a “genuine hearing of both sides in contention,”242
the African Court should interpret the Protocol to allow indi236. See PASQUALUCCI, supra note 97, at 20 (explaining that in the Inter–
American system, under the 1996 Rules of the Court, art. 23, victims were
allowed representation at the reparations stage of proceedings).
237. See Trinidade, supra note 235, at 416.
238. See PASQUALUCCI, supra note 97, at 20 (Inter-American Court amended
the definition of “parties to the case” to include the “victim or the alleged victim, the State, and, only procedurally, the Commission”).
239. See MARK W. JANIS, ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 67 (1995)
(viewpoint of Sir Humphrey Waldock).
240. Lawless, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16.
241. Id. at 15.
242. Mahoney, supra note 231, at 131.
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viduals to be represented in all hearings before it. The role of
the African Commission, then, more clearly becomes that of
guardian of the public interest.
IV. THE BROADER LEGAL CONTEXT
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Contentious Cases
Article 3 provides that the African Court’s jurisdiction extends to the Charter, the Protocol and “other relevant human
243
While
rights instruments ratified by the states concerned.”
the first two legal bases (the Charter and the Protocol) are not
surprising, the third certainly is. At first glance, this provision
seems to enlarge the subject matter of the African Court in contentious cases to include all other human rights instruments.244
The use of qualifiers such as “relevant,” “ratified,” “human
rights” and “by the state concerned,” however, may actually
serve to limit the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.245
The most important qualifier is “ratified,” which implies that
the instruments referred to must be treaties, not merely declarations or other non-binding legal texts or instruments. African
human rights treaties, such as the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU
Refugee Convention),246 the 1990 African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child (African Children’s Committee)247 and
the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of
Women in Africa, should be considered first.248 Indeed, the
Nouakchott Draft Protocol restricted the term “other treaties”
to exactly this group by including the word “African” before

243. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
244. The Protocol does not restrict the term “other relevant human rights
instruments” in art. 3 to certain geographical regions or to certain institutional frameworks (e.g., the OAU/ AU). See id.
245. Id.
246. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems
in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969, CAB/LEG/24.3 (entered into force June 20, 1974),
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1997, supra note 25, at 34 [hereinafter OAU
Refugee Convention].
247. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 1990,
CAB/LEG/153/Rev 2 [hereinafter African Children’s Committee], reprinted in
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1997, supra note 25, at 38.
248. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 29(1).
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249
The OAU/AU’s inclusion in the
“human rights instrument.”
African Court’s jurisdictional scope seems logical considering
the problematic dispute resolution mechanisms inherent in
many of these treaties. For example, the OAU Refugee Convention’s lack of a dispute settlement mechanism has always been
one of its weaknesses.250 Moreover, because the African Children’s Committee’s mandate is so similar to that of the African
Commission,251 and suffers from the same institutional and
functional weaknesses, it seems only logical to supplement and
reinforce its protective mandate by introducing the African
Court as a judicial body with competence over its provisions.
African human rights instruments such as the 1976 Algiers
Universal Declaration on the Rights of Peoples,252 the Kampala
253
Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa, and the numerous
resolutions of the African Commission are excluded from serving as a basis for a contentious case because of their nonbinding nature.
Reliance is further restricted to “human rights” treaties.
Some treaties adopted under OAU auspices have a significant
bearing on human rights, but are not human rights instruments in the narrow sense of that phrase. In one of its advisory
opinions, the Inter-American Court distinguished “modern human rights treaties,” the objectives of which are “the protection
of the basic rights of individual beings irrespective of their nationality,” from “multilateral treaties of the traditional type”
that are “concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of

249. Nouakchott Draft Protocol, supra note 49, at 259, art. 3(1).
250. See generally George Okoth-Obbo, Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of
the 1996 OAU Refugee Convention, 8 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 3 (2000) (discussing the
OAU Refugee Convention); Robin Ramcharan, The African Refugee Crisis, 8
AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 119 (2000) (arguing that refugee rights offenses should be
re–conceptualized as human rights violations and that the African human
rights machinery should be improved to deal with such cases).
251. Like the African Commission, the African Children’s Committee has a
broad promotional mandate, including the competence to examine state reports, and to consider inter–state and individual communications. African
Children’s Committee, supra note 247, at 45–46, arts. 42, 43 & 44.
252. Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, Algiers, July 4, 1976,
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 1, at 782.
253. Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa, Res. 36, U.N.
th
ESCOR, 36 mtg., annex (1997), http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res
/1997/eres1997-36.htm, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 1, at 822.
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254
The
rights for the mutual benefit of the contracting State.”
main dividing line is that states assume obligations “towards all
individuals within their jurisdiction” when they ratify human
rights treaties, and not merely “in relation to other States.”255
Thus, AU treaties such as the 1968 African Convention on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources256 and the 1977
Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa257 are
not included in the African Court’s jurisdiction under Article 3.
Although these treaties place obligations upon states that have
important human rights implications, they do not provide for
human rights in the sense of direct entitlements or subjective
rights available to individuals.258 Likewise, the AU Constitutive
Act, the treaty establishing the African Economic Community
(AEC Treaty) and regional economic treaties such as the Economic Community of West African States Treaty (ECOWAS
Treaty) do not qualify as “human rights” treaties, despite making adherence to the African Charter part of their aims and objectives.259 The principal goal of these treaties is economic and

254. Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC–2/82, Inter-Am
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 2, para. 29 (Sept. 24, 1982), http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/iachr/b_11_4b.htm.
255. Id.
256. African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Sept. 15, 1968, CAB/LEG/24.1 [hereinafter Convention on Nature],
reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 1, at 116.
257. OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, July 3,
1977, CM/187 (XXIX) Annex II Rev. 1, http://www.africa-union.org/
home/welcome.htm, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 1, at 116.
258. Although the purpose of the Convention on Nature is to ensure the
conservation of natural resources such as soil and water, individuals do not
have standing under the Convention to “enforce” these policies. Convention
on Nature, supra note 256, arts. 4, 5.
259. See generally Evarist Baimu, The African Union: Hope for Better Protection of Human Rights in Africa? 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J 299 (2001) (discussing
the AU); Frans Viljoen, The Realization of Human Rights in Africa through
Sub–Regional Institutions, 7 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 185 (1999). See also Treaty
Establishing the African Economic Community, June 3, 1991, art. 3(g), 30
I.L.M. 1241, 1253 (on economic groupings) [hereinafter Treaty Establishing
AEC]; Treaty Establishing Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa,
Nov. 5, 1993, art. 6(e), 33 I.L.M.1067, 1076 [hereinafter Treaty Establishing
Common Market]; Economic Community of West African States: Revised
Treaty, July 24, 1993, art. 4(g), 35 I.L.M. 660, 668 [hereinafter Economic
Community of West African States].
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260
Although all of these organizations conpolitical integration.
sider human rights in the formulation and application of their
policies,261 this fact alone cannot transform them into human
rights organizations or their founding treaties into human
rights instruments. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that judicial institutions have already been or are being established to settle disputes arising from these treaties.262
Because African states do not qualify as state parties to other
regional human rights treaties,263 the omission of “African” implies that the Court can adjudicate matters arising under UN
human rights treaties to which AU members, who are also UN
members, are parties. The phrase “by the States concerned”
implies that an individual communication may be directed to
the African Court on the basis of a UN human rights treaty if
the respondent state has ratified it.264 The problems arising
from this expansion in jurisdictional scope are legion. For example, it would mean that a communication under the ICCPR
could be submitted to either the HRC or the African Court.
This may lead to divergence in jurisprudence and to forumshopping where quasi-judicial and judicial institutions are compared and played off against one another.265 As Österdahl notes,
it “may be a delicate matter for the African Court to apply an
international convention to which non-African states are also
parties, and to render judgments on how the Convention should

260. See, e.g., Treaty Establishing AEC, supra note 259, at 1253, art. 3(g);
Treaty Establishing Common Market, supra note 259, at 1067, art. 6(e); Economic Community of West African States, supra note 259, at 668, art. 4(g).
261. See Treaty Establishing AEC, supra note 259, at 1253, arts. 4(1)(a), 6;
Economic Community of West African States, supra note 259, at 668, arts.
3(1), 3(2)a–o.
262. For example, the AU Assembly adopted the Protocol to the African
Charter, thus creating the African Court. See Protocol to the African Charter,
supra note 1.
263. Membership in the Council of Europe or the Organization of American
States (OAS) is a prerequisite for becoming a state party to either the European Convention or American Convention. European Convention, supra note
17, art. 66(1); American Convention, supra note 181, art. 74(1).
264. See Christof Heyns, The African Regional Human Rights System: In
Need of Reform?, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 155, 166–67 (2001) (noting that this
interpretation might inhibit states from ratifying the Protocol and UN treaties
as a result).
265. See Charney, supra note 45, at 699, 706.
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266
be interpreted on a particular point.” Even more strikingly, a
state that had not accepted the optional individual complaints
procedures under Article 34(6) may find that the African Court
usurps jurisdiction against it under Article 3.267 Additionally,
this interpretation would allow individuals to submit cases on
the basis of UN treaties, such as the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, which ordinarily prohibit the submission of individual communications.268 A solution is to interpret “States concerned” as all state parties to the Protocol, not
only the state against which the complaint is brought. Such a
reading would at least restrict the African Court’s jurisdiction
in contentious cases to UN treaties ratified by all state parties
to the Protocol.269
But the problems raised may remain illusory, at least for the
time being. Nineteen states have ratified the Charter so far
and only one has made an Article 34(6) declaration.270 Because
direct access to the Court by individuals is restricted to states

266. Inger Österdahl, The Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae of the African
Court of Human and People’s Rights: A Comparative Critique, 7 REV. AFR.
COMMISSION ON HUM. & PEOPLES RTS. 132 (1998).
267. For example, Lesotho is a state party to the African Charter and the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). It has ratified the Protocol, but has not
made the optional declaration under CAT allowing individuals to submit
communications to the CAT Committee. Therefore, an individual may submit
a contentious case to the African Court under the Protocol, alleging a violation
by the Lesotho government, even though that individual could not submit a
communication to the CAT Committee. Compare Protocol to the African
Charter, supra note 1, art. 3, and Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N.
th
GAOR, 39
Sess., 93d mtg. art. 21(1984), http://www.un.org/
documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm.
268. See, e.g., MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 98 (1998) (discussing the omission of
a petitions procedure in the Covenant). The process of adopting an Optional
Protocol to the Covenant, providing for the right of petition, is ongoing. See
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Mar. 14, 2004, UN Doc. E/CN/.4/2004/44
(most recent report of the open–ended working group investigating this issue),
http://ods–dds–gva.unog.ch/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G04/120/29/PDF/G0412029
.pdf?OpenElement).
269. This interpretation does not entirely solve the problem. For example,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by all the state
parties to the Protocol, and, thus, could potentially be interpreted by the African Court.
270. See List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol, supra note 56.
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making an optional declaration, the extended jurisdiction of
Article 3 applies only to those states.271 Otherwise, cases must
first be presented to the Commission using its normative legal
framework, which is the African Charter; only violations of the
African Charter may be brought before the African Commission.272 Moreover, even if those cases are referred to the Court
(either before, during or after the Commission’s consideration),
it is questionable whether the African Commission’s referral
should be restricted to the legal basis of its findings.273 In my
opinion, referral does not extend the initial legal basis under
which the case was submitted. The extended jurisdictional basis, with its concomitant problems, will only arise in a relatively
small percentage of cases.274 Individuals bringing cases directly
before the African Court should have a much wider array of
substantive rights to invoke than they had under the Charter.275
B. Legal Aid
Although the Protocol provides that parties may be repre276
sented by lawyers of their choice, this “choice” may not be
available to all individuals and NGOs if they lack the financial
resources to retain their own lawyer. Although the Protocol
adds that free legal representation “may be provided where the
interests of justice so require,”277 the use of passive voice, which
271. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 3.
272. African Charter, supra note 1, art. 56(2). But see Media Rights Agenda
th
v. Nigeria, Communication 224/98, 14 Ann. Activity Report, supra note 76, at
57 (Commission found Nigeria in violation of numerous Charter provisions
and “Principle 5 of the UN basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary”).
273. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 6(1), 6(3), 8.
274. See, e.g., Österdahl, supra note 266, at 137 (drawing the distinction
between arts. 60 and 61 of the Protocol, which entitle the Commission to draw
inspiration, and art. 3, which provides a legal basis for application).
275. Unfortunately, the travaux préparatoires of the Protocol do not provide
an explanation for the African Court’s expansive jurisdiction, leaving one to
speculate that it may have been influenced by a misreading of Articles 60 and
61 of the African Charter. The Protocol’s drafters also may have been influenced by the notion that all possible means should be brought to bear on
states to ensure that their human rights obligations are observed.
276. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 10(2) (stating
that “[a]ny party to a case shall be entitled to be represented by a legal representative of the party’s choice”).
277. Id.
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identifies neither the subject or the object of such legal aid,
seems deliberate and implies that it may not be available to all
parties. Because legal aid must contend for the African Court’s
limited resources, either a special fund should be established to
provide legal aid or states should assume responsibility for providing it. Neither possibility is prohibited by the Protocol, and
the African Court itself should administer this as a regular part
of its budget. The cost may not be great, as the text does not
suggest that free representation should extend to local remedies, yet, many potential litigants will fail solely for lack of
funds.278 What role should the inability to exhaust local remedies, due to financial constraints, play in the African Court’s
decision on admissibility, especially in a case of direct access?279
Bringing a case before the African Court is bound to be an expensive exercise, as it would include the cost of a senior lawyer
and travel expenses.280
A passive interpretation of the Protocol leaves open the possibility that states may also benefit from legal aid. This should
be applied only in exceptional circumstances, as states normally
have their own legal staffs. Other factors to consider when
awarding legal aid include at which stage of the proceedings
application should be made and whether it should be made to
judges or the Registrar. Additionally, since individuals should
not be expected to pay costs incurred by governments, the African Court must decide whether to award costs.281 These aspects

278. See, e.g., C. F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
327–32 (2004).
279. See Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1),
46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC–11/90, Inter–Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 11, para. 31 (Aug. 10, 1990)
(finding that indigents need not “exhaust the relevant domestic remedies”
before appealing directing to the Inter–American Commission when a right
granted under the American Convention is involved).
280. The practice in most international tribunals, including the African
Commission, is that complainants are represented by lawyers. This would, in
the absence of legal aid, impose significant financial burdens on complainants.
281. See, e.g., Murray, Comparison Between the African and European
Courts, supra note 5, at 214.
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need to be clarified in the Rules of Procedure or in an addendum thereto, as in the case of the European Court.282
C. Amici Curiae
Scholar Abdelsalam Mohamed has highlighted the role of
amicus curiae briefs in the European and Inter-American
283
In the Inter-American system, the competence of the
Courts.
Inter-American Court to hear any person whose evidence,
statement or opinion it deems to be useful serves as the legal
basis for allowing such briefs.284 In the era before Protocol No.
11, the European Court permitted third-party participation in
proceedings based on a similarly-worded provision in its Rules
of Court.285 As a result, NGOs with particular expertise, such as
Amnesty International, Article 19 and America Watch, and
academics or academic institutions that focus on the issues before courts have assisted these two Courts.286 Mohamed argues
that the Nouakchott Draft Protocol supports an inference that
the extension of this possibility to the African Court should be
adopted.287 The Nouakchott Draft Protocol differs from the
adopted text in an important respect in that the Protocol does
not include the phrase “and other representations.”288 This
seems to suggest a restriction on evidence. It is still debatable
282. Legal aid under the European system has been described as “very limited and means–tested at state level.” Murray, Comparison Between the African and European Courts, supra note 5, at 214–15.
283. Abdelsalam A. Mohamed, Individual and NGO Participation in Human Rights Litigation Before the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights:
Lessons From the European and Inter–American Courts of Human Rights, 8
MICH. ST.–DCL J. INT’L L. 377 (1999).
284. Inter-American Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 166, art 45(1).
285. 1992 Rules of European Court, supra note 233, at 277, R. 41(1). See
also Anthony Lester, Amici Curiae: Third Party Interventions before the European Court of Human Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN
DIMENSION 341 (Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1988).
286. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 611, 634–
37 (1994).
287. See Mohamed, supra note 283, at 379–80 (basing his inference on language in the Nouakchott Draft Protocol).
288. Compare Nouakchott Draft Protocol, supra note 49, art. 25(2) (stating
that the Court “may receive written and oral evidence and other representations”), and Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 26(2) (similar
provision, but Protocol lacks the phrase “other representation”).
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whether the distinction between evidence and testimony is significant, which leaves the door open for the Rules to include
amicus curiae briefs as part of the term “testimony.”289
The most persuasive rationale for third-party arguments is
that they may assist the African Court by providing it with
comprehensive legal arguments.290 A court with relatively meager resources should embrace opportunities to hear supplementary arguments. However, such “friends of the Court” should
refrain from stifling the voices of the parties, and hearing them
should not become overly burdensome. Therefore, the African
Court should first receive and peruse arguments made by parties, and then decide if third-party briefs make valuable contributions. The African Court may also decide to consider such
arguments only in written form.
D. Advisory Opinions: Role for NGOs
Even if an advisory opinion is not binding on the party requesting it, it may have profound persuasive force and international repercussions.291 Advisory opinions have been used extensively and effectively in the Inter-American system.292 During its fledgling years, the Inter-American Court dealt with
more advisory than contentious cases, primarily because the
Inter-American Commission and respondent states were reluctant to submit contentious cases to the Inter-American Court.293
Former Inter-American Court Judge Thomas Buergenthal
claims that this development was fortunate because it provided
the Inter-American Court with a chance to consolidate itself, as
289. Evidence is defined as “something that tends to prove; ground for belief,” while testimony is defined as “a declaration or statement made under
oath or affirmation by a witness in a court, often in response to questioning, to
th
establish a fact.” WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 493, 1480 (4
ed. 1999).
290. Mohamed, supra note 283, at 382–83.
291. Jo M. Pasqualucci, Advisory Practice of the Inter–American Court of
Human Rights: Contributing to the Evolution of International Human Rights
Law, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 241, 242 (2002).
292. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 97, at 80.
293. See David Harris, Regional Protection of Human Rights: The InterAmerican Achievement, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1,
23 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998) (noting the reluctance
of the Commission to make referrals and the small number of states accepting
the African Court’s optional jurisdiction).
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governments in “fragile emerging democracies” found it “easier
to give effect to an advisory opinion than to comply with a contentious decision in a case they lost.”294 The situation faced by
the Inter-American Court is clearly analogous to Africa, where
democracy is still seeking a strong foothold.295
Three entities may request advisory opinions and claim
standing before the African Court: states, the AU and its organs, and a broader and undefined group called “African organisations.”296 As in the Inter-American system, state parties
may make such requests;297 most of the Inter-American Court’s
advisory opinions were given at the request of state parties.
States requesting an advisory opinion from the African Court
need not have ratified the Protocol, therefore, this aspect of the
African Court’s jurisdiction is open to non-state parties.298
The AU and any of its organs may also request advisory opinions.299 Such requests could be duplicative, however, as the African Court of Justice, once formed, is to have jurisdiction over
the interpretation and application of the AU Constitutive Act;300
the African Court of Justice will also have advisory jurisdiction.301 Reading the two protocols together, it would seem that
the AU should refer matters with a human rights focus to the
African Court of Human Rights. Although allowing the AU and
294. Thomas Buergenthal, The European and Inter-American Human
Rights Courts: Beneficial Interaction, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 123, 131 (Paul Mahoney et al. eds., 2000).
295. See Österdahl, supra note 266, at 141 (noting that the “softer, less
obliging channel of advisory opinions” may be more applicable outside a “well–
functioning democratic environment characterised by the rule of law”).
296. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
297. Id. See also American Convention, supra note 181, art. 64 (stating that
a member state may request an advisory “opinion regarding the compatibility
of any of its domestic laws with ... international instruments”).
298. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 3, 5 (states
must be parties to the African Charter).
299. Id. art. 4(1).
300. AU Constitutive Act, supra note 89, art. 26. See Udombana, Toward
the African Court, supra note 1, at 78.
301. Protocol of the Court of Justice, supra note 207, art. 44(1) (provides
that AU organs, as well as a “Regional Economic Community” may request
advisory opinions “on any legal question”). See also id. art. 20 (expansive
formulation of Article 44(1) should be read with Article 20, which provides
that the Court “shall have regard to” the broad category of “international treaties”).
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other African intergovernmental organizations to request advisory opinions may seem problematic because they are not parties to the Protocol or the African Charter and, thus, cannot be
held accountable for failure to comply with the Protocol’s provisions,302 the fact that they all subscribe to African Charter’s
standards and goals makes it less so. Therefore, the African
Human Rights Court should be the judicial institution to advise
about human rights matters related to policy development and
formulation.
Any “African organisation recognised by the AU” may also
request an advisory opinion from the African Human Rights
Court.303 In parts of the Protocol, the terms “African intergovernmental organisations” and “NGOs with observer status before the Commission” have been used.304 Thus, the word “organisation” is a generic term, and encompasses both intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies. However, the organizations must be “African;”305 an “African organisation” does not
include NGOs enjoying observer status with the African Commission because members of that group need not be African.
The organization must also be “recognised by the AU.”306 All
African NGOs enjoying observer status with the African Commission should qualify as such; observer status should be regarded as a form of recognition by the AU. Regional economic
arrangements such as ECOWAS and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), which are part of the AEC regional economic arrangements and building blocks of the AU,
also qualify. Other African organizations should also be able to
request advisory opinions, so long as their work is associated
with the AU or AEC.
It is possible that NGOs requesting advisory opinions will try
to use the procedure to bring disputes against states that have
not accepted the African Court’s contentious jurisdiction.
States and AU organs may also attempt to abuse the African
Court’s advisory procedure by cloaking contentious cases as re302. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 4(1) (provides that
the OAU, any of its organs “or any African organization recognized by the
OAU” may approach the Court with a request for an advisory opinion).
303. Id.
304. Id. arts. 5(1)(e), 5(3) (respectively).
305. Id. art. 4(1).
306. Id. art. 5(3).
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quests for advisory opinions. The potential for abuse by NGOs
should not be overstated, however, as the African Court’s advisory opinions are only advisory and, thus, remain nonbinding.307
Advisory opinions may be requested on a legal matter relating to the Charter or “any other relevant human rights instruments.”308 The subject matter jurisdiction for advisory opinions
is broader than for contentious cases and includes questions
concerning any human rights “instrument,” those both nonbinding and declaratory and those open to ratification and binding. Any conceivable human rights document may be invoked,
as long as it is relevant. However, even though the African
Court’s advisory subject matter jurisdiction is much broader
than its contentious jurisdiction, it is less controversial because
of its non-binding nature.
V. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Other issues, such as the seat of the Court, the election of
judges, the adoption of Rules of Procedure and the importance
of resources, are likely to affect the success of individual cases
before the African Court.
A. Seat of the Court
The seat of the African Court is not specified in the Protocol.
Determination of the seat is left to the AU Assembly once the
Protocol enters into force.309 The seat must be “from among
State parties” to the Protocol.310 The seat of the African Commission, Banjul, presented numerous problems for individuals,
particularly because of its inaccessibility and the cost of transportation to reach it.311 Inadequate infrastructure and lack of
immediate access to the media and important role-players also
cause difficulties.312 Therefore, the problems arising from the
choice of Banjul as the African Commission’s seat should be
avoided. The state in which the African Court is based should
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

PASQUALUCCI, supra note 97, at 29.
Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
Id. art. 25.
Id. art. 25 (1).
ANKUMAH, supra note 5, at 186 (alluding to these factors).
See generally Danish Centre for Human Rights, supra note 80.
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have: (1) political and economic stability; (2) a sustained record
of democracy, good governance and domestic human rights protection; (3) a developed infrastructure, a travel hub and regular
connections to international travel routes; (4) institutions of
higher learning equipped and willing to support the Court and
its Registry; (5) a good record of submitting state reports and
other forms of cooperation (such as implementing recommendations) with the African Commission and UN treaty bodies; and
(6) international media, diplomatic corps and international organizations. Ultimately, however, the decisive factor will be the
state party’s commitment to undertake the financial and political responsibilities of housing the African Court.
Other factors may also have to be considered. Symbolism
may play a role; for example, inviting venues include Dakar (Ile
Gôreé, emphasizing the post-colonial aspect), Cape Town (Robben Island, as a post-apartheid icon linked to the struggle
against “foreign domination”) and Kigali (in post-genocide
Rwanda). Another factor is the distance between the seats of
the African Commission and the African Court. The European
model, when it still functioned with dual institutions, provided
for a joint seat at Strasbourg.313 In the Inter-American system,
the seats of the Court and Commission are separated by vast
distances–San José, Costa Rica, and Washington D.C.314 The
geographic separation of these two institutions may account, at
least partly, for the initial lack of cooperation between the Inter-American Commission and Court. In any event, discussions
concerning the African Court’s location may prompt reconsideration of the Commission’s location.
B. Election of Judges
The African Court will consist of eleven judges elected for sixyear terms.315 Unlike the European system, not every state

313. 1992 Rules of European Court, supra note 233, at 265, R. 15.
314. Statute of the Inter-American Court, supra note 155, art. 3.; Statute of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Oct. 1979, O.A.S. Res. 447,
th
9 Sess., art. 16, http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic15.htm.
315. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 15. Judges may be
re-elected once, and to ensure continuity only three judges of the initial group
will serve a full six-year term. Four judges will serve only two years and four
others will serve only four years. Judges are allocated terms in accordance
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316
In fact, a
party will be represented on the African Court.
judge may not hear cases involving his or her own state.317 The
elected judges choose their own President and Vice-President
for a once-renewable term of two years.318 As the only judge
serving on a full-time basis and residing at the seat of the African Court,319 the President is likely to play a very important role
in the establishment and running of the African Court. The
President will also work closely with the Registrar, whom the
African Court appoints to this full-time position, and who also
resides at the seat.320
The phases of nomination and election of judges should be
clearly distinguished. Only state parties to the Protocol may
nominate candidates.321 When the Secretary General calls for
nominations, each member state may nominate three individuals, two of whom must be nationals of that state.322 Thus, they
may also nominate candidates from AU member states that
have not accepted the Protocol.323 A list of these names is sent

with lots drawn by the Chair of the AU commission (previously the OAU Secretary General). Id.
316. See id. art. 14(2); LCHR’s Chart Showing Gender and Regional Balance
in Elections to International Courts and Tribunals, at www.humanrightsfirst.org/International_justice/icc/election/judges_gender_region_040303.pdf
(last visited Oct. 24, 2004).
317. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 22. The exclusion of
judge–nationals from hearings also differs from the ICJ’s appointment of ad
hoc judges from states involved in disputes before it. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 31, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S.
993,http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.
htm. See also Krisch, supra note 1, at 717 (noting that the Protocol position
improves the perception of impartiality and may “represent a reaction to the
problems of the Commission in this respect”). The intended impartiality of
the African Court’s judiciary is underscored throughout the Protocol. See
Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 11(1) (judges are “elected in
an individual capacity”); id. art. 16 (judges must take an oath to “discharge
their duties impartially and faithfully”).
318. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 21(1).
319. Id. art. 21(2).
320. Id. art. 24. Unlike the Protocol, the African Charter provides that the
OAU Secretary General shall appoint the Secretary to the African Commission. The Commission’s dissatisfaction with its inability to appoint or dismiss
its Secretary may have influenced the Protocol’s appointment provision for the
African Court. Compare id., and African Charter, supra note 1, art. 41.
321. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 12(1).
322. Id. arts. 12(1), 13(1).
323. Id. art. 12(1).
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to the members of the Assembly thirty days before its next session.324
The Assembly, composed of fifty-three states, chooses the
judges from those nominated.325 This may seem inadvisable, but
leaving the decision to the AU makes sense because any of the
other states may become a state party during the general term
of tenure, and should have some say in the composition of the
African Court.326 Furthermore, the African Court is an AU institution, and the AU takes political responsibility for its functioning and the enforcement of its judgments. The African
Court and AU are intertwined in many ways: the African Court
is dependent on the AU for its budget,327 the AU Assembly has
the final say over the removal of judges from office328 and de329
termines, and may change, the African Court’s seat, the Court
reports annually to the Assembly, specifying instances of noncompliance,330 and the monitoring judgments is the Assembly’s
responsibility.331 Thus, the Assembly has a vested political and
financial interest in and responsibility for the African Court. In
any event, this methodology is also followed for the election of
members to the African Commission.332
The election process is guided by the qualifications of the candidate and the need for a balanced judiciary.333 Candidates
must be AU nationals, not necessarily of state parties, must be
“jurists” by profession, with specific and demonstrated human
324. Id. art. 13(2). At its third ordinary session, the AU decided to hold
sessions no longer annually, but twice a year. Assembly of the African Union,
rd
3 Ann. Sess., AU Doc.Assembly/AU/Dec.53 (III) (July 6–8, 2004).
325. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 14; List of Countries
Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol, supra note 56.
326. In the Inter-American system, state parties to the American Convention nominate and elect judges. American Convention, supra note 181, art.
53. In Europe, before Protocol No. 11, the Council of Europe, its Court and
Parliamentary Assembly respectively, nominated and elected judges (one
judge per state). European Convention, supra note 17, art. 39(1).
327. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 32.
328. Id. art. 19(2).
329. Id. art. 25.
330. Id. art. 31.
331. Id. art. 29(2).
332. All fifty-three AU members have been state parties to the African
Charter since 1999, so this distinction is no longer relevant. List of Countries
Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol, supra note 56.
333. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, arts. 11, 14.
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rights expertise and experience (“competence and experience in
the field of human rights”) and should be “of high moral character.”334 Additionally, there must be “adequate gender representation” (not “equal,” which, in any event, is impossible in a court
of eleven judges),335 as well as representation of geographical
336
areas and Africa’s “principal legal traditions.” This addresses
a recurring problem with the election of members to the African
Commission as there was occasionally overrepresentation or
non-representation of a region. The Protocol correctly links geographic concerns to varying legal traditions.337 It would, for
instance, not make sense to ensure proportional representation
for the West African region by electing two judges from Anglophone/common law countries. While the regional representation requirement may be met if each of the five regions is “represented” by at least one judge on the African Court,338 greater
attention should be paid to insuring that each legal tradition is
represented, such as the Islamic/Shari’ah-based system, the

334. Id. art. 11(1).
335. Id. arts. 14(3), 12(2) (Article 12 requires that “due consideration” be
given to “adequate gender representation.”). See also AU Constitutive Act,
supra note 89, art. 4(1) (defining the promotion of gender equality as one of
the AU’s principles). Women are underrepresented in international law, including international judicial bodies; at the beginning of 2003, only eleven of
the forty–three judges on the European Court were women. See INTERIGHTS,
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (2003), at http://www.nchr.
gr/downloads/Judicial_Appointments_to_ECHR.pdf. There has never been
more than one woman of the seven judges on the Inter–American Court. See
generally Inter-American Court of Human Rights, at http://www.
corteidh.or.cr/general_ing/composition.html (providing the names of both current and former judges). It appears that female participation in quasi–
judicial bodies is more generally accepted; the African Commission has seen
its female representation increase from zero out of eleven in 1993 to five out of
eleven in 2003, including its President (Commissioner Sawadogo). See generally African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, at http://www.
achpr.org/english/_info/members_en.html. Two of the seven members of the
Inter–American Commission were women at the beginning of 2003. See generally InteriAmerican Commission on Human Rights, at www.cidh.org.
336. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 14(2).
337. Id.
338. The nineteen ratifying states cover all five regions—north (two), west
(seven), east (three, including the island states of Comoros and Mauritius),
central (five) and south (two). See List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol, supra note 56.
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common law system, the civil law system, and the particular
brand of mixed “Roman-Dutch law” in Southern Africa.339 The
candidates’ personal profiles should be such as to insure that
expertise of traditional African customary law and tradition is
also represented.340
Individuals have a role in the domestic nomination process
and the AU’s election process. NGOs and individuals in state
parties should involve themselves by nominating competent
persons internally or by challenging incompetent or inappropriate candidates at the domestic level. For this to be possible, AU
member states should ensure that the domestic nomination
process is transparent and that a free exchange of information
is readily available. These efforts should extend to the election
process, which should be supported by civil society in all AU
member states. It is important that the process be as transparent as possible, with the curriculum vitae of a candidate subjected to public scrutiny. The Protocol provides that a judge’s
position is incompatible with “any activity that might interfere
with the independence or impartiality” of judges.341 Although
the Rules of Procedure will prescribe what these activities are,
efforts should be made to prevent the election of candidates who
clearly elude these criteria.342 Such vigilance is necessary because judges have the competence to draft Rules of Procedure343
and, once elected, may do so to suit their personal ends.
C. Adoption of Rules of Procedure
The African Court “shall draw up its Rules and determine its
344
procedures.” As the discussion above makes clear, these rules
339. See generally J.N.D. Anderson, The Adaptation of Muslim Law in SubSaharan Africa, in AFRICAN LAW: ADAPTATION AND DEVELOPMENT 149 (Hilda
Kuper & Leo Kuper eds., 1965) (discussing Islamic/Shari’ah–based systems);
1–2 READINGS IN AFRICAN LAW (Eugene Cotran ed., 1970) (discussing common
and civil law systems); Leslie Rubin, The Adaptation of Customary Family
Law in South Africa, in AFRICAN LAW: ADAPTATION AND DEVELOPMENT 196
(Hilda Kuper & Leo Kuper eds., 1965) (discussing Roman–Dutch law).
340. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 14(2).
341. See id. arts. 18, 8.
342. Some Commissioners served as ambassadors for their countries in
other African states, inviting the perception that they exercise bias in their
decision-making.
343. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 33.
344. Id. art. 33.
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may go a long way to strengthen or weaken the position of individuals before the African Court. As suggested by the Protocol,345 the African Court should consult the African Commission
on numerous issues. Such discussions, to be held soon after the
inauguration of the judges, may result in amendments to the
Commission’s Rules of Procedure.346
The Commission’s Rules of Procedure should clarify under
which circumstances it may submit cases to the African Court.
There are a number of possibilities. First, the Rules could provide for direct submission to the African Court, without consideration by the African Commission, under exceptional circumstances of immediate importance. Second, the Rules could allow the African Commission to submit a case after declaring it
admissible and conducting fact-finding. If this possibility is
accepted, the Commission’s Rules of Procedure must incorporate a clear fact-finding procedure. However, room must be left
for the African Court to deal with the factual issues. Third, the
Rules could determine which factors to account for when the
African Commission refers a matter to the African Court after
making a finding on the merits or after having amicably resolved the matter. Obviously, the Court’s Rules of Procedure
must correspond with all these provisions and grant individuals
a clear right to be represented before it, either personally or
through counsel.
When parties before the African Court reach an amicable settlement, the African Court must scrutinize the agreement for
its compliance with human rights, and must formally adopt it
as a judgment in order to enable implementation or monitoring.347 Such judgments serve not only the interests of individual

345. Id. (providing that “[t]he Court shall consult the Commission as
appropriate”).
346. See Badawi Elsheikh, supra note 1, at 258.
347. See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 9. A literal interpretation of “in accordance with the provisions of the Charter” would restrict the Court’s competence to deal with settlements because the African
Charter only provides for settlement in communications between inter–state
parties; it is silent on settlement negotiations involving individuals. African
Charter, supra note 1, arts. 47–51. Another interpretation of that phrase is
that the settlement in any case before the Court must be human-rightsfriendly, or “in accordance with the (substance of the) provisions of the Charter.” See Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 9. See also Euro-
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parties before the African Court, but also the general interest of
human rights protection. The judgment should indicate the
precise nature of action required by the state, such as the nature of legislative amendments or the amount of compensation,
and should specify a time period within which action must be
taken.348
The Commission’s Rules of Procedure should be amended to
allow submission to the African Court, enabling the African
Court to take provisional measures in urgent cases that have
not yet been submitted to it for consideration.349 When a contentious case is pending before the African Court, individuals
should be allowed to present a request for provisional measures
directly to the African Court. They should also be allowed to
present their views about state compliance.350
Third-party arguments (amicus curiae briefs) should be allowed, but only under suitable conditions.351 An emphasis on
written submissions may, for example, ensure that the African
Court only hears from those who set out views or authorities
not covered by the parties or the African Commission.
D. Importance of Resources
The African Court’s establishment comes at a time of competing claims to limited resources.352 To a large extent, the AU
pean Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court, R. 44(2), 62(3), 38 I.L.M. 208,
226, 234 (1998) [hereinafter Rules of Court].
348. See, e.g., Skoogström v. Sweden, 83 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11 (1984)
(dissenting opinion).
349. See supra Part II.A (discussing interim measures).
350. See, e.g., Inter-American Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 166, art.
25(6) (“The beneficiaries of urgent measures or provisional measures ordered
by the President may address their comments on the report made by the State
directly to the Court. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights shall
present observations to the State’s report and to the observations of the beneficiaries or their representatives.”).
351. See, e.g., 1992 Rules of the European Court, supra note 233, R. 37(2)
(“The President may ... invite or grant leave ... to any person concerned other
than the applicant … to submit written comments ... on issues which he shall
specify.”).
352. The AU’s financial resources have remained constant, but claims on its
resources have increased because of the entry into force of a number of legal
instruments, e.g., the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament, the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council and the Protocol to the African Charter
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Constitutive Act is only a framework document that allows for
the adoption of detailed “Protocols” to establish institutional
organs.353 The Constitutive Act stipulates such action with respect to the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice, the
African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank.354 The Economic, Social and Cultural
Council’s functions and organization shall be determined “by
the Assembly.”355
When the AU was launched in 2002, few of its institutional
components had been set up.356 At present, three institutions —
the Peace and Security Council, the Pan-African Parliament
and the African Human Rights Court — are in the process of
being established.357 All functional treaty bodies are developed
through phases: negotiation, adoption, formal acceptance, entry
into force, and operationalization. The fifth phase of operationalization is sometimes underplayed, but it is of determinative
importance. Institutional mechanisms and procedures are only
words on paper without the personnel, paper, printers, buildings and infrastructure to make them a reality. Meager allocations of resources undermine independence. Over the years, the
OAU has suffered from problems of inadequate financing. Despite numerous pleas by the OAU/AU Assembly that the neceson Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on
Human and Peoples’ Rights.
353. AU Constitutive Act, supra note 89, arts. 17(2), 18(2).
354. Id. arts. 17(2), 18(2), 19.
355. Id. art. 22(2).
356. Packer & Rukare, supra note 4, at 377.
357. See Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan-African Parliament, Mar. 2, 2001 (entered into force
Dec. 14, 2003), http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm. The AU Assembly designated South Africa as the country to host the Pan-African Parliament. Assembly of the African Union, Decision on The Launching and the
Establishment of the Pan African Parliament, 3d Ord. Sess., AU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.39 (III) (July 2004). See also African Union, List of Countries
Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to the Pan–African Parliament
(46 states have become parties to the Protocol), at http://www.africaunion.org/home/Welcome.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004). See also Protocol
Relating to Peace and Security Council, supra note 63; African Union, List of
Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol Relating to the
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (36
states have become parties), at http://www.africa–union.org/home/Welcom
e.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004).
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sary resources should be allocated to the African Commission,
funding for its activities is still lacking.358 Whatever modalities
of coexistence are worked out, the fact remains that the African
Court’s progress depends on a well-resourced and functional
African Commission. It should be recalled that the African
Children’s Committee was also launched recently and has not
yet been provided with a functional Secretariat. Where institutional proliferation meets financial need, there are bound to be
casualties.
A preliminary report on the financial implications of the African Court already indicates that the Court will not have adequate resources to meet its needs.359 The largest items are the
projected salaries for the full-time President of the Court, the
Registrar, a documents specialist, an accountant, two secretaries and two drivers/assistants.360 It is by no means certain that
a legal officer/researcher will be included in the budget. By the
same estimate, only $2,500 was budgeted for library books for
the first year.361
VI. CONCLUSION
The dawn of a new century has witnessed manifold institutional renewals at the regional level in Africa. These institutions, including the African Human Rights Court, should now
be strengthened to ensure their growth, taking into account
that the measure of their success will be the extent to which
they are able to improve the lives of Africans. The key to
unleashing the African Court’s potential lies in the hands of the
Court itself.

358. See, e.g., Annual Activities of the African Commission on Human and
People’s Rights, AHG/Dec 126 (XXXIV), in African Union Declarations and
Decisions Adopted by the Thirty–Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government (1998), available at http://www.africaunion.org/Official_documents/Heads%20of%20State%20Summits/hog/8HoGA
ssembly1998.pdf (“Reiterat[ing] its earlier decisions concerning the means for
the functioning of the Commission.”).
359. Practical Issues Relating to the African Court, reprinted in HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 1999, supra note 1, at 293.
360. Id. at 294.
361. Id. at 295.
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First and foremost, the African Court must not become a
white elephant — all institution and no cases to decide.362 To
prevent this, the African Court must ensure that its Rules of
Procedure allow access to individuals as extensively as the Protocol permits. The African Court must cooperate with the African Commission, whose Rules also need to be adapted. To
summarize, it is suggested here that the African Commission
should usually decide on the admissibility of communications,
but not on their merits. Inadmissible cases should end at the
Commission level. With respect to admissible cases, the African
Commission should engage in fact-finding and make efforts to
negotiate a friendly settlement before submitting the case to the
African Court. In exceptional, urgent cases, the African Commission may refer the case to the African Court without addressing it at all. Such an approach will unlock the potential of
the Court to supplement and strengthen the African Commission’s role in protecting individuals by ensuring that the deficiencies inherent in the quasi-judicial nature of the Commission
are overcome without causing more delay and cost.
Allowing individuals the broadest possible standing before
the African Court may well mean that the Commission’s protective role is restricted to admissibility findings in most cases and
fact-finding in some cases. Such an approach would enable the
African Commission to focus on that part of its mandate earmarked as promotional but which also serves definite protective
ends. Its non-communication-based role should be enhanced by
way of the resumption of on-site investigations, the improvement and extension of the examination of state reports, promotion and education of human rights generally and the Charter
in particular, as well as proactive activities of Special Rapporteurs. This is the best reading one could give to the requirement of “complementarity” between the Commission and
Court.363 The African Commission is retained and reinforced as
the AU’s main quasi-judicial human rights institution while
and the African Court is developed as its main judicial institution. This “complementarity” avoids duplication and delay.
For all the attention devoted to continental judicial institutions as manifestations of international human rights protec362. A variant on “all dressed up and nowhere to go.”
363. Protocol to the African Charter, supra note 1, art. 8.
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tion, their role and potential remain limited in comparison with
national institutions. National courts have to be the port of
first call for individuals, yet they are frequently ignored. There
are beliefs, deeply embedded in many African states, that inform a reluctance to use law and courts to resolve disputes.
Much of African life is “informal” and exists side-by-side with
more “formal” aspects of life.364 Over-formalized legal systems
reinforce this formality. Reliance on the law may be fanciful in
a context of low literacy, inaccessible sources (even legislation
and law reports), a lack of lawyers and legal aid, and conditions
of poverty or conflict overshadowing other concerns. Legal
norms are perceived as lacking legitimacy, as being transplants
from some European metropolis, and as consisting of rules and
norms that are juxtaposed unfavorably with traditional ways of
life. As an instrument of a highly centralized authority, law
does not penetrate into vast rural areas, thus remaining remote
and inaccessible. Bureaucracies and courts are either dysfunctional or function very slowly, and are steeped in corruption. 365
International human rights law’s focus on “exhaustion of local
remedies” takes too much for granted, and does not sufficiently
account for these factors. International tribunals face many
problems: overly formal systems, intimidating procedures, lack
of information, inaccessible texts, the perception that their decisions reflect a regional consensus in which local specificities
play only a minimal role, and the general remoteness of human
rights ideology from the daily lives of individuals. These problems are compounded in the African regional human rights system. Exercising a quasi-judicial mandate, an effective African
Commission bolstered by recourse to the African Human Rights
Court could go some distance in solving these difficulties.

364. See generally Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Protecting Human Rights in Plural Legal Systems of Africa: A Comparative Overview, in UNIVERSAL RIGHTS,
LOCAL REMEDIES: IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF
AFRICA 39, 58–60 (Abdullahi A. An-Na’im ed., 1999); Chidi Anselm Odinkalu
& Ibrahima Kane, An Assessment of Information and Training Resources, in
UNIVERSAL RIGHTS, LOCAL REMEDIES: IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF AFRICA 65, 68 (Abdullahi A. An-Na’im ed., 1999).
365. See, e.g., Ending the Graft in East Africa, DAILY NATION (Keyna), Oct.
6, 2003, available at http://www.nationaudio.com?News/EastAfrica/06102003/
Opinion/Editorial106102003779.html.

